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Abstract 
We provide the first systematic documentation and analysis of a generation gap in direct 
democracy outcomes across a wide range of topics using postelection survey data covering more 
than 300 Swiss referenda and four decades. We find that older voters are more likely to resist 
reform projects, particularly those that are associated with the political left. We separate age and 
cohort effects without imposing functional form constraints using a panel rank regression 
approach. The aging effect on political orientation is robust for controlling for arbitrary cohort 
effects and appears to be driven by expected utility maximization and not by habituation-induced 
status-quo bias. Our results suggest that population aging raises the hurdle for investment-like 
reform projects with positive net present values, long-run benefits and short-run costs in direct 
polls. 
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1 Introduction 
Age and birth-cohort affiliation are widely analyzed sources of heterogeneity in economic behavior 
(Chetty et al., 2014; Costa & Kahn, 2011; Demange & Laroque, 1999; Dynan et al., 2009; Giuliano & 
Spilimbergo, 2013; Juhn & McCue, 2016; Levin & Stephan, 1991; Messner & Polborn, 2004). Differ-
ences in the ways young and old consume, work, or vote are often referred to as a generation gap 
(Prasad, 1992). Popular voices argue that the generation gap today is wider than it has been at any 
time since the 1960s (Leonhardt, 2012). Examples are countless. Older workers tend to be more hes-
itant to adopt new technologies because of the more limited time available to recover the cost of 
training (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2017); however, those older workers are generally reported to be 
more hard-working (Jenkins, 2007). Pensioners in developed countries consume more than the 
young and hold a disproportionately large share of total financial assets and owner-occupied hous-
ing, despite having a lower savings rate (The Economist, 2010, 2016). Today’s American young are 
much less mobile than previous cohorts at the same age (The Economist, 2017a). Survey data suggest 
that in the US, political preferences and beliefs differ remarkably across generations. For example, 
the young are significantly more likely to support free trade, immigration, gay marriage, and 
measures that seek to reduce economic inequality (Pew Research Center, 2018).  
It is thus no surprise that generations also differ in the manner in which they make political decisions, 
both in a representative and in a direct democracy. Although in the 2016 US presidential elections, 
Trump won a 53% majority among voters aged 45 and over, Clinton voters clearly outnumbered 
Trump voters among the 18-to-44 age group. Within the group of those under 30, Trump’s share was 
as low as 37% (Mccarthy, 2017). In the 2017 United Kingdom general election, the Labour Party won 
43 of the 60 constituencies in which 15% or more of the adult population were full-time students, 
even though the Conservative Party won the most constituencies overall (The Economist, 2017b). In 
the 2016 “Brexit” (British exit) referendum, in which a majority of UK citizens voted to leave the 
European Union, a 59% majority of pensioners supported a British exit; that proportion was as low 
as 19% among the 18-to-24-year-olds (Schuster, 2016). Similar generational divides have been ob-
served to be the norm in referenda on education spending, health spending, green energy reforms, 
and major transport projects (Ahlfeldt et al., 2016).  
Such generation gaps in political orientations are a potential cause for concern. In a theoretical paper, 
Messner and Polborn (2004) made the compelling case that many “reform projects” share similari-
ties with investments in that they require some initial expenditure and pay dividends over a long 
period. Socially optimal decisions, accordingly, should maximize the expected utility of a newborn 
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individual who will face the costs and benefits of a project over the entire lifecycle. However, unless 
they are guided by altruism, rational voters of all ages will maximize their individual expected utility 
conditional on their stage in the lifecycle; i.e., they weigh the expected costs against the discounted 
benefits expected over their remaining lifetime. As voters age, the period over which they expect to 
receive the benefits decreases so that they become less inclined to support projects with long-run 
returns.  
Within this theoretical framework, a generation gap in political economy outcomes would not exist 
if voters were altruistic because older voters would internalize the benefits to younger generations 
and vice versa. By implication, a generation gap suggests that collective decisions are likely to deviate 
from optimal decisions that would maximize the net present value (NPV) for a newborn. This poten-
tial problem is quite topical against the background of two ongoing trends.  
First, direct democracy is on the rise, and lifecycle-specific attitudes and political orientations should 
become immediately relevant in public referenda.1 Since 1978, there has been a storm of ballot-box 
lawmaking in the US in virtually every field of policymaking (Matsusaka, 2005). Over 70% of the US 
population live in states or cities in which direct democracy is an established option for political de-
cision-making (Matsusaka, 2004). Moreover, direct democracy is spreading internationally. In many 
countries, it has become almost expected that first-order issues affecting national sovereignty be car-
ried directly to the voters. Examples include various referenda on European Union monetary and 
market integration, including the 2016 Brexit referendum; the 2004 “peace referendum” in Taiwan 
to define relations with mainland China; the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence from the 
UK; and the 2017 referendum on Catalonia’s independence from Spain.  
Second, population aging is set to become one of the major trends of the 21st century. Worldwide, the 
total population aged 60 or above is predicted to more than double in absolute and relative terms 
from 962 million in 2017 to 2.1 billion in 2050 and 3.1 billion in 2100. Over the same period, the 
population aged 80 or above is predicted to grow to 909 million, nearly seven times its value in 2017 
(United Nations 2017). If voters generally trade expected costs against the benefits expected over 
their remaining lifetime, population aging implies that projects with long-run returns and short-run 
costs will have fewer and fewer chances of winning majorities.  
1  In the US, a referendum differs from an initiative in that the former is a vote on a law that is already approved 
by the legislature whereas the latter is a vote on a law proposed by citizens. Throughout this paper, we use 
the term referendum as referring to any election in which citizens have a direct vote on a law.  
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To empirically substantiate the potentially worrisome implications of population aging against the 
background of a seemingly existing generation gap, the origins of the latter must be understood. 
While lifecycle-dependent utility maximization is one plausible explanation for age-related differ-
ences in voting, there is at least one plausible alternative. A status-quo bias is a frequently docu-
mented feature of economic behavior (Ciccone, 2004; Fernandez & Rodrik, 1991; Kahneman et al., 
1991). Theoretically, older voters could prefer the status quo because they have experienced it over 
a longer period. As voters age, they could become more averse to reform projects simply due to ha-
bituation (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). This hypothesis is consistent with the empirical obser-
vation that individuals become more risk-averse as they age (Dohmen et al., 2017). While population 
aging would still affect a society’s ability to respond to changing circumstances, a status-quo bias 
would not specifically affect policies that benefited recent or future generations more than older gen-
erations. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to these two behavioral economics concepts that 
potentially rationalize age-dependent voting as the utility-maximization hypothesis and the habitu-
ation hypothesis.  
Moreover, an empirically observed generation gap is not necessarily causally related to voter age. A 
generation gap that is observed at any given point in time may equally be attributed to cohort effects 
because differences in age directly map to differences in birth years. Individuals with similar birth 
years, often referred to as birth cohorts or social generations, live through their “impressionable 
years” in similar social and political environments. Consequently, values, attitudes and orientations 
tend to be similar within cohorts and different across cohorts (Krosnick et al., 1989; Mannheim, 
1952). A generation gap that originates from cohort effects will not interact with population aging 
because today´s young will maintain their political attitudes and orientations as they age. If cohort 
effects follow a random walk, the generation gap could even shrink or reverse, irrespective of 
whether the population ages. In a cross section, however, it is impossible to distinguish between ag-
ing and cohort effects.  
In this paper, we provide systematic evidence of the existence of a generation gap in direct democ-
racy outcomes and the first econometric analysis of its origins. To this end, we utilize a large micro 
data set of postelection surveys in Switzerland, in which direct democracy is popular like in few other 
countries. Our data cover all 305 federal referenda held between 1981 and 2017, which we group 
into 24 officially defined topical themes. We use the individual yes vs. no voting decisions recorded 
in the data and a referendum-specific mapping that we overlaid on the official documentation to en-
code two binary outcome variables. With the reform orientation, we distinguish between a voting 
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decision that supports the legal status quo and a vote for a change in legislation. To encode the polit-
ical orientation, we group the 305 referenda into four attitude groups based on the 24 officially de-
fined themes. Consistent with conventional definitions in the political science literature, we define 
votes as left-wing if they correspond to positions that can be considered politically liberal (e.g. pro 
international integration or a smaller military), pro-environmental protection (e.g. in favor of climate 
change mitigation measures), in the interest of younger generations (e.g. workers and families with 
dependent children as opposed to pensioners), or pro-progressive redistribution (e.g. favoring state 
revenues via income tax over tolls and user fees) (Budge et al., 2001; Neumayer, 2004).  
Our empirical objective is to analyze how the two outcomes, reform orientation and political orien-
tation, vary by voter age. In doing so, we control for a battery of individual voter characteristics and 
engage with the empirical challenge of separating age and cohort effects. The standard problem in 
the analysis of age, period, and cohort (APC) effects is that an individual’s age is a linear combination 
of its birth year and the year in which it is observed. It is thus impossible to identify APC effects with-
out constraints on the functional form, a problem that is known as the APC conundrum (Fienberg & 
Mason, 1985). From a methodical perspective, a novelty of our study is that we estimate an uncon-
strained rank model to distinguish between age and cohort effects in a flexible manner. We remove 
period effects by computing the rank a cohort occupies in the distribution of orientations within a 
period. Conditional on this transformation, we can separately identify age and cohort effects on ori-
entation ranks non-parametrically and without imposing any constraints on functional form. As a 
welcome collateral effect, the estimated age parameter in this rank regression approach has conven-
ient bounds of positive and negative unity. This is because if orientations strictly and monotonically 
changed in age, all cohorts would move along the rank distribution by one step each year they aged 
as a new cohort entered the data at the top or the bottom of the distribution.  
The evidence substantiates the popular notion of a generation gap in direct democracy outcomes. 
Younger voters are more likely to vote for change and support reform projects, particularly those 
that can be associated with the political left. Younger voters, in their voting decisions, tend to be less 
conservative, attach a higher priority to protecting the environment and are more supportive of pol-
icies that, in relative terms, benefit the young. Voters in their 30s and 40s, more than those in their 
20s or at later stages of the lifecycle, tend to support policies that have progressive redistribution 
consequences. 
These age-related patterns are strong features of the data and persist if we control for arbitrary co-
hort effects in unconstrained rank models. Controlling for cohort effects, the political orientation 
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rank increases by, on average, 0.62 each year a voter ages (one is the upper bound), on a scale in 
which low ranking corresponds to a left-wing and high ranking corresponds to a right-wing political 
orientation. Political orientations change particularly strongly around the retirement age, where our 
estimates of the conditional age effect on the orientation rank are near the upper bound of unity. 
Cohort effects are also evident in the data although many of the difference in voting behavior across 
social generations can be attributed to age differences. However, even after controlling for arbitrary 
age effects, we find that baby boomers (born between 1946 and 1964) are more inclined to support 
environmental protection, policies that benefit the young, and progressive redistribution than other 
generations. Recent generations (born since 1965), in terms of political preferences, are more similar 
to their prebaby-boomer ancestors (born up to 1945). On the rank scale, the age-adjusted difference 
in political orientation between cohorts born from 1935 to 1939 (more right-wing) and baby boom-
ers born from 1955 to 1959 (more left-wing) is equivalent to the estimated effect of an individual 
aging by 32 years.  
We generally find stronger age effects on political orientation than on reform orientation. Significant 
within-cohort effects of age on political orientation persist if we control for reform orientation. Thus, 
over their voting life, cohorts shift from the political left to the political right in a manner that is not 
determined by an increasing tendency to support the status quo. As cohorts age, the increasing sup-
port for the legal status quo goes hand in glove with a political orientation that shifts from the polit-
ical left to the right for two of four groups of referenda (environmental and generational attitudes). 
Within another group (ideological attitudes), cohorts also tend to shift to the political right as they 
age (from liberal to conservative); however, there is no significant aging effect on reform orientation. 
In yet another category (fiscal attitudes), aging significantly increases the support for legal change 
whereas the effect on political orientation is non-monotonic. Overall, with regard to rationalizing the 
generation gap, there is more support for the utility-maximization than the habituation hypothesis.  
Our findings suggest that population aging can affect direct democracy outcomes and, more gener-
ally, may affect political economy outcomes. The effect of population aging in Switzerland does not 
appear to have been decisive until recently. However, a lower-bound estimate of five referenda (of 
97 referenda held since 2004) would have had a different outcome if the age distribution had re-
mained constant at 1981 levels. The effect will increase as population aging progresses, raising the 
question of how collective decisions on investment-like reform projects should be made in the future. 
Our study connects to several strands in the economics literature. One strand concerns how age 
shapes economic behavior (Chetty et al., 2014; Costa & Kahn, 2011; Dynan et al., 2009; Giuliano & 
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Spilimbergo, 2013; Juhn & McCue, 2016; Levin & Stephan, 1991), particularly in the context of popu-
lation aging (Abel, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2007; Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2017; Demange & Laroque, 
1999; Poterba, 2001) and the resulting intergenerational conflicts (Abramson, 1979). 
We also relate to political economy literature that concerns the nature of direct-democratic decision-
making (Deacon & Shapiro, 1975; Feld & Matsusaka, 2003; Matsusaka, 2004; Osborne & Turner, 
2010) and specifically how interest groups seek to influence political outcomes (Ahlfeldt et al., 2017; 
Feinerman et al., 2004; Frey et al., 1996) leading to political opposition to projects with positive net 
present value (Ciccone, 2004; Kahneman et al., 1991). In analyzing the determinants of age-related 
opposition to reform projects, we connect to studies that distinguish between utility maximization 
and other determinants of economic behavior that lead to status-quo bias (Ciccone, 2004; Fernandez 
& Rodrik, 1991; Kahneman et al., 1991; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Further, our analysis is con-
nected to economics research on various types of publicly provided goods on which voters often de-
cide directly, such as education (Cellini et al., 2010; Collins & Kaplan, 2017), accessibility and infra-
structure (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Baum-Snow, 2007; Duranton et al., 2014), and the protection of health 
(Currie et al., 2015; Davis, 2004) and the environment (Chay & Greenstone, 2005; Greenstone & 
Gallagher, 2008).  
Relevant to the wider social sciences literature, our unconstrained rank models used to separately 
identify age and cohort effects are a methodological contribution to a broad literature concerned with 
the analysis of APC effects (Bijlsma et al., 2017; Bloome, 2014; Chetty et al., 2014; Fu, 2016; Giuliano 
& Spilimbergo, 2013; Juhn & McCue, 2016; Levin & Stephan, 1991; Mason et al., 1973; O’Brien, 2016; 
Rodgers, 1982).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our empirical strategy 
against the background of the challenges to the identification of APC effects. In Section 3, we discuss 
the Swiss context and our data. We document the existence of a generation gap in referenda on a 
wide range of subjects in Section 4 before we separate age and cohort effects in Section 5. In Sec-
tion 6, we use our estimated aging effect to assess the degree to which population aging has affected 
direct votes since 1981. Section 7 concludes the study. 
2 Identification 
Consider a general model that describes the probability 𝑉𝑖,𝑐,𝑟,𝑡 of an individual voter deciding to vote 
in line with a certain orientation (e.g. a vote that supports left-wing policies) or attitude (e.g. liberal 
or environmentalist).  
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𝑉𝑖,𝑐,𝑟,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡) + 𝑔(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡) + ℎ(𝐵𝑐) + 𝑘(𝑇𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑟,𝑡, (1) 
where i indexes individuals belonging to birth cohort c and r indexes referenda held at time t. 𝑓(𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡) 
is a function of a vector of variables 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 describing individual voter characteristics, 𝑔(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡) is a 
function of the age 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡  of a voter belonging to cohort c at time t, ℎ(𝐵𝑐) is a function of the voter 
cohort’s birth year 𝐵𝑐 , and 𝑘(𝑇𝑡) is a trend in time 𝑇𝑡. 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑟,𝑡 is a random error that captures unob-
served voter characteristics and idiosyncratic referendum effects.  
We are primarily interested in an estimate of 𝑔′ = 𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝑐,𝑟,𝑡/𝜕𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡, i.e. the causal effect of aging hold-
ing other effects constant. We refer to this effect as the aging effect. An identification challenge orig-
inates from 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 being a linear combination of the birth year 𝐵𝑐  of cohort c and the time of the 
referendum 𝑇𝑡:  
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝐵𝑐, (2) 
The first problem common to the analysis of individual or grouped voting data is that in a cross sec-
tion, age is a linear transformation of 𝐵𝑐  because there is no variation in 𝑇𝑡; i.e., 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐 = 𝑎 − 𝐵𝑐, where 
a is a constant. A cross-sectional estimation of the effect of voter age on voting outcomes inevitably 
identifies the composite effect of aging and cohort affiliation, i.e., 𝑔′ − ℎ′, where ℎ′ = 𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝑟,𝑐,𝑡/𝜕𝐵𝑐,𝑡.
There is no way to separate the effects of age and cohort affiliation other than by assumption (e.g., by 
assuming that ℎ′ = 0).  
One positive feature of our data set, which is rare in the context of referendum data, is that we ob-
serve voting decisions across a relatively large number of referenda spread across several decades. 
Although this longitudinal dimension of our data helps overcome the first identification problem, 
there is a second. There is no variation in 𝑇𝑡 conditional on 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 and 𝐵𝑐  because 𝑇𝑡 = 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑐 . 
Without restrictions, it is, therefore, impossible to identify the effects of 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 , 𝑇𝑟, and 𝐵𝑐 . This is the 
APC conundrum, a fundamental problem in the analysis of APC effects that has been faced by re-
searchers from a wide range of disciplines for decades (Abel, 2001; Abramson, 1979; Costa & Kahn, 
2011; Dynan et al., 2009; Giuliano & Spilimbergo, 2013; Hanoch, Giora; Honig, 1985; Heathcote et al., 
2005; Levin & Stephan, 1991; Mason et al., 1973). Despite a long tradition of dealing with this prob-
lem, the literature has achieved little consensus on how to address it.  
One approach is to estimate age and cohort effects without controlling for period effects. If k(.) is an 
additive function, the researcher then identifies 𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝑐,𝑡/𝜕𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑔
′ + 𝑘′ and 𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝑐,𝑡/𝜕𝐵𝑐 = ℎ
′ + 𝑘′.
Thus, to obtain unbiased estimates of 𝑔′ and ℎ′, the researcher must impose the strong identifying 
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assumptions that 𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝑐,𝑡/𝜕𝑇𝑡 = 𝑘
′ = 0. Likewise, a control for cohorts can be omitted if one is willing
to assume that ℎ′ = 0 (Heathcote et al., 2005; Juhn et al., 1993). To relax the identifying assumption, 
some researchers have proposed controlling for period effects by means of time-varying variables 
that capture the determinants of an outcome (Heckman & Robb, 1985) although concerns regarding 
unobserved time-varying controls naturally remain. Another approach is to impose constraints on 
the functional form of 𝑔(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡) and ℎ(𝐵𝑐). A classic approach is to assume a parametric function for 
the age effect (generally a polynomial function) and cohort effects that are common to groups of birth 
cohorts (e.g., birth cohorts defined by decades). The age effect is then identified from within cohort 
variation. However, such a control for cohort affiliation is naturally imperfect, and the results tend to 
be sensitive to the definition of cohort groups (Luo & Hodges, 2015). Ultimately, the separation of 
age and cohort effects relies on functional form assumptions (Rodgers, 1982).  
In our analysis, we are primarily interested in how orientations and attitudes change as voters age; 
i.e., our aim is to estimate age effects conditional on arbitrary cohort effects. To achieve this goal, we
desist from the identification of period effects. Because the number of referenda per period is limited, 
period effects are likely to capture referendum effects that depend on the varying cost-benefit cases 
of referenda. Thus, the interpretation of period effects is not particularly intuitive in our context. Ag-
gregated to the cohort-period level, equation (1) can be rearranged: 
?̅?𝑐,𝑡 − 𝑓(?̅?𝑐,𝑡) = 𝑔(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡) + ℎ(𝐵𝑐) + 𝑘(𝑇𝑡) + 𝜀?̅?,𝑡 , (3) 
where upper bars indicate means across individuals within a cohort-period cell and the left-hand 
side of the equation describes the mix-adjusted (for observable individual characteristics) propen-
sity of a voting outcome by cohort c in a period t. We then subject equation (3) to a transformation: 
𝑅𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑅 (?̅?𝑐,𝑡 − 𝑓(?̅?𝑐,𝑡)) = 𝑚(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡) + 𝑛(𝐵𝑐) + 𝜀?̃?,𝑡 , (4) 
where R(.) is a function that gives a cohort´s field rank (lowest rank to highest value) in the distribu-
tion of voting propensities within a period. The rank transformation removes period effects because 
the rank of a cohort within a period 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 is independent of period effects 𝑘(𝑇𝑡). Conditional on the 
transformation, the longitudinal dimension then allows for the separate identification of aging effects 
and cohort effects without further constraints, which is why we refer to this approach as an uncon-
strained rank model. 
Of course, the rank transformation removes cardinal information as (mean) orientations and atti-
tudes are converted into an ordinal scale. However, the rank transformation also lends an intuitive 
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interpretation to the marginal effects we estimate. If orientations and attitudes were exclusively de-
termined by age and the propensity to support a certain type of initiative decreased with age, each 
cohort, as it reached the minimum voting age, would enter the data with a rank of one. Because in 
every period, a new cohort would enter the data with a rank of one, all other cohorts would climb up 
the rank scale by one step every period they age, until they eventually exited the data. Thus, the im-
plied aging effect would be 𝜕𝑅𝑐,𝑡/𝜕𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑚´(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡) = 1. Likewise, we’d expect 𝑚´(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡) = −1 
if aging was associated with increases in the propensity to support initiatives. These values thus rep-
resent convenient bounds for estimated aging effects. By contrast, an aging effect of zero would imply 
that any cross-sectional correlation between voting outcomes and voter age was spurious and at-
tributable to correlated cohort effects.  
3 Context and data 
Direct democracy has a long tradition in Switzerland. For 150 years, voters have been routinely called 
to the polls to make decisions on a wide range of topics at the municipal, cantonal, and federal levels. 
Adjudications concerning changes to the constitution and the ratification of international treaties 
must be approved by the electorate by a direct vote. All other adjunctions can be subject to facultative 
referenda if a sufficient number of signatures are collected.2 Occasionally, government authorities 
propose a counter initiative or alternative version to the original initiative on the same referendum 
ballot. In general, federal referenda – on which we focus in this paper – are held four times a year, 
with votes on up to ten to twelve referenda on each occasion. Eligible voters are automatically regis-
tered for the polls. Along with their polling cards, voters receive an information package that includes 
arguments in favor of and against each proposition, estimates of anticipated benefits and financial 
consequences, and where applicable, a summary of the parliamentary debate and outside opinions 
by interest groups. Swiss voters, therefore, may generally be considered experienced and well in-
formed when they cast their votes.  
Switzerland not only utilizes direct democracy decisions like few other countries in the world, its 
authorities also collect unique micro data on voter decisions and characteristics. Since 1977, repre-
sentative postelection surveys have been conducted after each referendum, asking approximately 
1,000 eligible voters about their voting decisions and a broad range of individual characteristics. 
2  Henceforth, the term referenda refers to all forms of public votes on the federal level in Switzerland – public 
initiatives, facultative referenda, and obligatory referenda. 
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These so-called VOX surveys occur within two to three weeks after a referendum by telephone inter-
views. The features covered in the data include the actual voting behavior (e.g., if they voted, what 
they voted for, whether they felt well-informed on the matter), political attitudes (e.g., party identi-
fication, trust in the government) and socio-economic attributes (e.g., age, household size, gender, 
education level, income).3 Because the design of the surveys has changed over time, the department 
of political science at the University of Geneva publishes standardized versions of the original data, 
which we use in our work. These VoxIt data cover virtually all referenda since 1981, combining a 
standardized set of variables from the VOX surveys with official referendum data, e.g., results, turn-
out, government and party endorsement. In 2016, the VOX project was replaced by the so called 
VOTO surveys, which are run by the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS), the Cen-
tre for Democracy Aarau (ZDA), and the LINK Institute for Market and Social Research. Since the 
VoxIt and VOTO surveys ask very similar questions, it is possible to pool the covered referenda, sub-
ject to some harmonization that we describe in the Appendix.4  
We restrict the data set analyzed here to respondents who cast a vote in a referendum, i.e., those who 
had formulated a view. This mitigates many of the typical concerns regarding the validity of voting 
survey data (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001) at the cost of losing approximately half of the observa-
tions. Because of the frequency with which direct democracy decisions are made in Switzerland and 
the quality of the data, Swiss referenda have become a popular subject of political economy research 
(Funk, 2016; Funk & Gathmann, 2015; Kovalchik et al., 2005). We refer to a growing number of stud-
ies for further details on the institutional setting and the Swiss post-vote survey data (Feld & 
Matsusaka, 2003; OECD, 2009). A complementary summary is in the Appendix.  
Between June 14, 1981 and May 21, 2017, 312 public referenda took place at the federal level in 
Switzerland. Survey data availability constrains the set of analyzed referenda to 305. These referenda 
fall into 12 officially defined contextual categories (Ebene-1 Deskriptoren). Within each category, we 
define subcategories of contextually homogeneous referenda, which we refer to as themes. We define 
3  The VOX surveys are financed by the Swiss Federal Confederation as well as non-government and private 
organizations and institutions. Gfs.bern AG is an institute for political, communications and social research 
in Switzerland and was responsible for the collection and preparation of the VOX data. The political science 
institutes from the universities of Bern, Geneva, and Zurich are responsible for the questionnaire designs, 
analysis, reporting of results and the standardization process of the VoxIt surveys. For more information, 
see e.g., http://www.gfsbern.ch/de-ch. 
4  FORS is the Swiss national Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences. It maintains a national social science 
data archive and facilitates access to official statistical data. For more information on the VOX, VoxIt and 
VOTO surveys, see www.forscenter.ch and http://www.voto.swiss. 
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a total of 24 themes, which we then aggregate to four attitude groups. The ideological attitude group 
comprises referenda on questions that concern the constitutional order, foreign affairs and security 
policy and relate to voters’ beliefs and values in a manner that a voter decision could be described as 
either conservative or liberal. The environmentalist attitude group comprises referenda in which 
voters’ decisions have direct consequences for the protection of the environment, e.g., by affecting 
carbon emissions or protecting natural habitats. In the generational attitude group, we include ref-
erenda on policies that are specifically targeted at certain age groups, e.g., allowances for families 
(with dependent children) or labor market regulations (e.g., regarding maximum working hours) 
that affect those who are not yet retired. Finally, the fiscal attitude group includes referenda in which 
voters have the choice between options that have distributional consequences that may be described 
as either progressive (e.g., relatively more important income tax) or regressive (e.g., relatively more 
important tolls and user fees). In the interest of a transparent empirical analysis, we define attitude 
groups to render them mutually exclusive. 
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of referenda and voting observations by categories and themes 
and how themes aggregate to attitude groups. We also compare the share of yes votes in the survey 
data to the official voting results published by the Swiss Federal Council. As expected, the yes-vote 
share of the survey data is close to the official result if the number of referenda (within a theme or 
category) is sufficiently large. However, across all referenda, we find the yes-vote share in the survey 
data to exceed the official results by some notable 3.1 percentage points, possibly due to a survey 
bias (Funk, 2016). Since we generally analyze the distribution of voting decisions within referenda, 
a potential bias will not affect our results to the extent that it is uncorrelated with voter characteris-
tics.  
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Tab. 1. Summary by category, theme, and attitude group 
# 
Official categories (numbers) 
and defined themes (letters) 
N Share yes votes 
Attitude group Ref. Survey Survey Actual Diff. 
- 01 Constitutional order 31 16,064 0.549 0.532 0.017 - 
1 A Pro liberal law system 19 10,297 0.596 0.57 0.026 Ideological 
2 B Pro direct democracy 12 5,767 0.466 0.465 0.001 Ideological 
- 02 Foreign affairs 12 7,556 0.553 0.498 0.056 - 
3 A Pro international integration 12 7,556 0.553 0.498 0.056 Ideological 
- 03 Security policy 22 12,707 0.481 0.455 0.025 - 
4 A Pro smaller military 22 12,707 0.481 0.455 0.025 Ideological 
- 04 Markets (regulation) 20 12,092 0.452 0.438 0.014 - 
5 A Pro worker protection 11 6,815 0.427 0.417 0.01 Generational 
6 B Pro protection of consumers 9 5,277 0.484 0.467 0.017 Ideological 
- 05 Agriculture 13 5,878 0.561 0.536 0.025 - 
7 A Pro limiting intensive farming 13 5,878 0.561 0.536 0.025 Ideological 
- 06 Public finance 28 15,293 0.517 0.513 0.004 - 
8 A Pro progressive fiscal policy 17 10,119 0.504 0.494 0.01 Fiscal 
9 B Pro fiscal expansion 11 5,174 0.541 0.55 -0.008 Fiscal 
- 07 Energy 14 7,786 0.484 0.419 0.065 - 
10 A Pro sustainable energy 14 7,786 0.484 0.419 0.065 Environmentalist 
- 08 Transport and infrastructure 30 17,906 0.533 0.505 0.028 - 
11 A Pro sustainable mode 25 15,052 0.528 0.503 0.025 Environmentalist 
12 B Pro lower transport tolls and taxes 5 2,854 0.564 0.519 0.044 Fiscal 
- 09 Environment 20 12,456 0.447 0.427 0.021 - 
13 A Pro-environment protection 9 5,835 0.439 0.41 0.029 Environmentalist 
14 B Pro more housing supply 11 6,621 0.455 0.442 0.013 Ideological 
- 10 Social policy 92 58,418 0.46 0.461 -0.001 - 
15 A Pro liberal health policies 14 7,904 0.483 0.472 0.011 Ideological 
16 B Pro health expenditures 18 11,452 0.43 0.426 0.004 Fiscal 
17 C Pro state pension 13 7,890 0.411 0.433 -0.022 Fiscal 
18 D Pro lower retirement age 5 2,722 0.411 0.404 0.006 Generational 
19 E Pro unemployment benefits 5 3,334 0.473 0.458 0.014 Generational 
20 F Pro family allowances 12 8,360 0.401 0.39 0.011 Generational 
21 G Pro liberal immigration policy 25 16,756 0.528 0.538 -0.01 Ideological 
- 11 Research and education 15 7,905 0.543 0.5 0.043 - 
22 A Pro expenditures on education 7 3,094 0.512 0.444 0.068 Fiscal 
23 B Pro limiting in vivo studies 8 4,811 0.563 0.535 0.028 Ideological 
- 12 Arts and culture 8 3,790 0.637 0.564 0.074 - 
24 A Pro support of culture and media 8 3,790 0.637 0.564 0.074 Fiscal 
- All referenda 305 177,851 0.518 0.487 0.031 - 
Notes:  Data cover 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Categories are defined in the official data. Themes are our own 
definitions of subgroups of referenda within categories. All themes are defined to be in line with the orientation 
of the political left (as opposed to the political right). Attitude groups are our own definitions of contextual 
groups to which we aggregate themes. N ref. is the number of referenda within a category and theme. N sur. is 
the number of survey observations within a category and theme. Share yes votes survey is the proportion of 
yes votes in the survey data. Share yes votes actual is the proportion of yes votes of all votes cast in a referen-
dum. Share yes votes diff. is the difference between the two.  
To render the data amendable to pooled analysis, we define voting outcomes that are comparable 
across referenda. Our first outcome variable assumes the value of one if the vote is in line with a 
change in the legal status quo and zero otherwise. To this end, we combine a voter’s individual voting 
decision (yes vs. no) as recorded in the survey and a referendum-specific mapping on whether a yes 
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or a no vote would imply a change in legislation. We refer to this outcome variable as reform orienta-
tion. Our second outcome variable assumes the value of one if the vote is in line with a position that 
can be ascribed to the political left, and zero if it is in line with the political right. For this purpose, 
we first create a referendum-specific mapping of voter decisions to attitudes (within attitude 
groups). Following conventions in the political science literature, we then associate a left vote with 
the following attitudes: liberal (as opposed to conservative), high-priority (as opposed to low prior-
ity) environmentalist, pro-young (as opposed to pro-elderly), and pro progressive (as opposed to 
regressive) redistribution (Budge et al., 2001). We refer to the resulting outcome variable as political 
orientation. 
A full list of the referenda included in our study with the mapping of a yes vote to reform and political 
orientations is in Appendix II. For 17 referenda held before 1985, voter age is defined by five-year 
age categories (instead of integer values). In an auxiliary step summarized in Appendix I, Section 3.2, 
we predict a voter´s age (within age categories) based on the wide range of socio-demographic vari-
ables in the data set. We also note that the minimum voter age in Switzerland was lowered from 20 
to 18 in 1991. To maintain a consistent definition over the study period, we generally exclude re-
sponses from voters below the age of 20.  
4 Voting outcomes by age 
4.1 Generation gap by themes and attitude groups 
Before we proceed to estimating the causal effects of aging on voting outcomes, we examine the ex-
tent to which generation gaps may be documented across a range of referendum topics. In Figure 1, 
we illustrate how the conditional mean political orientation controlling for voter characteristics and 
referendum effects changes by age for each of the 24 themes defined in Table 1. For each theme, we 
first run OLS regressions of the political orientation (defined in Section 3) against voter characteris-
tics, referendum effects, and integer age-bin effects and then plot the results of local polynomial (de-
gree = 0) regressions of the latter against age. The conditional mean political orientation may be 
interpreted as the propensity of a voter with average characteristics casting a vote that is consistent 
with the positions of the political left. 
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Fig. 1. Political orientation by age and theme 
Notes:  The figure summarizes the mean vote by voter age and 24 themes across 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. 
Themes are defined so that a voting outcome of zero is in line with the political right and an outcome of one is 
in line with the political left. For each theme, we regress the voting outcome against a battery of individual 
controls, referendum fixed effects and one-year-age-bin fixed effects. The point estimates (solid lines) and 95% 
confidence intervals (gray-shaded areas) are from local polynomial regressions (degree = 0) of the age-bin 
fixed effects against (integer) age. Dashed lines are the mean outcome across all age groups within themes. N 
is the number of referenda within a theme. 
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A casual inspection of Figure 1 reveals reasonably well defined downward trends for 17 of 24 themes, 
implying that younger voters are more likely to support the positions of the political left than are 
older voters. For the remaining seven themes (2A, 6A, 6B, 8A, 10C, 11A, 12A), the trend is less clear. 
No theme displays an unambiguously positive relationship between age and political orientation.  
Replicating the same approach separately for referenda in the four attitude groups introduced in 
Section 3, we find similar downward trends in ideological, environmentalist, and generational atti-
tudes. Younger voters, on average, tend to be less conservative, attach higher priorities to the pro-
tection of the environment, and are more supportive of policies that, in relative terms, benefit the 
young. Concretely, controlling for observable individual characteristics, the propensity of a 20-year-
old voter casting a conservative vote is approximately six percentage points (11%) lower than that 
of an 80-year-old voter. The similarly defined generation gap in terms of a high vs. a low priority 
environmentalist attitude is approximately ten percentage points (18%). In referenda in which the 
decisions have consequences that directly depend on a voter’s stage in the lifecycle, the generation 
gap is even larger. The propensity of casting a vote that favors the young declines by more than fifteen 
percentage points (30%) over the voting life. 
Within each group, there appears to be a retirement effect, i.e., a relatively sharp reduction in condi-
tional mean attitudes around the age of 60, when many voters retire. The effect is particularly strong 
in the generational attitude group. Considering Figure 1, this retirement effect appears to be driven 
by referenda concerning unemployment benefits and retirement age (themes 10D and 10E). This is 
intuitive given that those who have already retired do not benefit from unemployment allowances. 
Similarly, they do not benefit from the opportunity to retire earlier. This generational attitude effect 
is also consistent with recent US survey evidence revealing that early generations are relatively less 
likely to support policies that benefit the young (Pew Research Center, 2018). 
Within the fiscal attitude group, the age trend is non-monotonic. Up to their early 30s, voters are 
increasingly more likely to support progressive fiscal policies that are associated with redistribution 
from higher to lower income and wealth groups. From then on, voters become increasingly more 
averse to the same kind of policies. This lifecycle pattern is consistent with voters becoming more 
economically vulnerable as they start their own families and then less vulnerable due to increasing 
incomes and inherited wealth.  
Briefly summarized, ideological, environmental, and generational attitudes tend to shift from posi-
tions that are associated with the political left toward the political right as voter age increases. Re-
garding fiscal attitudes, a similar trend exists over approximately two-thirds of the voting life (from 
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the 40s onwards). In all four attitudes, the trend accelerates around retirement age. The age effect is 
particularly strong where the economic incentives are directly related to a voter’s stage in the lifecy-
cle (in the generational attitude group). Overall, the evidence presented in this section provides sys-
tematic evidence that substantiates the notion of a generation gap in direct democracy outcomes, the 
origins of which are to be explored in the remainder of the paper.  
Fig. 2. Voting by age and attitude group 
Notes: This figure summarizes the mean vote by age and attitude groups across 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. We 
group the referenda into attitude groups by the theme defined in Table 1. A voting outcome of zero is in line 
with the political right, while an outcome of one is in line with the political left. For each attitude group, we 
regress the voting outcome (one if in support of the theme, zero otherwise) against a battery of individual 
controls, referendum fixed effects and one-year-age-bin fixed effects. The point estimates (solid lines) and 95% 
confidence intervals (gray-shaded areas) are from local polynomial regressions (degree = 0) of the age-bin 
fixed effects against (integer) age. Dashed lines are the mean outcomes across all age groups within attitude 
groups. N is the number of referenda within an attitude group. 
4.2 Reform orientation vs. political orientation 
One question concerning the origin of the generation gap documented above is whether a negative 
effect of age and the political orientation indeed reflects an expected utility of (left) reform projects 
that increases during the remaining life time (Messner & Polborn, 2004). The alternative hypothesis 
is that voters become more averse to reform projects due to habituation; i.e., older voters prefer the 
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status quo because they will often have experienced it over a longer period (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988). Distinguishing between utility-maximization and habituation as drivers of age 
effects would not be empirically feasible if our two primary outcomes (reform orientation and polit-
ical orientation) were collinear, i.e., that a change in the legal status quo strictly implied a change in 
policy toward the political left.  
In Table 2, we cross-tabulate the two outcomes. Across all referenda, we find that a pro status quo 
vote is approximately twice as likely to be consistent with support for a right-wing policy outcome 
than a left-wing policy outcome. Evidently, the majority of referenda in Switzerland in recent decades 
have been concerned with “left” reform projects. Nevertheless, approximately 17.9% of all votes are 
in support of change and right-wing policies at the same time (a similar fraction votes for the status 
quo to preserve a left-wing policy), suggesting that reform orientation is an imperfect predictor of 
political orientation overall. There is a significant degree of variation in the correlation between the 
two outcome measures across attitude groups. Within the ideological attitude group, a relatively 
large fraction of 20.9% voted for change to support a conservative (right-wing) position. A similarly 
large faction of voters in referenda in the fiscal attitude group voted for change to support regressive 
(right-wing) fiscal policies. The same fractions are as low as approximately 10% in the environmen-
talist and generational attitude groups, implying that it will be empirically difficult to distinguish be-
tween utility-maximization effects and habituation effects within these groups. 
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Tab. 2. Cross-tabulation of reform orientation and political orientation 
All referenda All referenda 
Right Left Total Right Left Total 
Status quo 59,063 32,205 91,268 Status quo 33.2% 18.1% 51.3% 
Change 31,821 54,762 86,583 Change 17.9% 30.8% 48.7% 
Total 90,884 86,967 177,851 Total 51.1% 48.9% 100.0% 
N 177,851 Diagonal sum 64.0% 
Ideological attitude Environmental attitude 
Right Left Total Right Left Total 
Status quo 27.9% 20.9% 48.7% Status quo 40.2% 10.7% 50.9% 
Change 20.9% 30.3% 51.3% Change 10.7% 38.4% 49.1% 
Total 48.8% 51.2% 100.0% Total 50.9% 49.1% 100.0% 
N 83,574 Diagonal sum 58.2% N 28,673 Diagonal sum 78.6% 
Generational attitude Fiscal attitude 
Right Left Total Right Left Total 
Status quo 48.1% 9.9% 58.0% Status quo 31.6% 21.6% 53.2% 
Change 10.0% 32.0% 42.0% Change 20.6% 26.1% 46.8% 
Total 58.1% 41.9% 100.0% Total 52.3% 47.7% 100.0% 
N 21,231 Diagonal sum 80.1% N 44,373 Diagonal sum 57.7% 
Notes:  Data cover 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. The reform orientation is encoded as status quo if the vote is in 
support of the status quo (often, but not always a no vote) and as change if the vote supports a change in 
legislation. The political orientation is encoded as right if it is in line with positions of the political right and 
left if it is in line with the positions of the political left. A summary of left-wing attitudes by themes is in Table 1. 
Using the same empirical approach as in Figure 1 and Figure 2, we illustrate how the conditional 
mean reform orientation (left panel) and political orientation (middle panel) changes by age in Fig-
ure 3. We find a downward age trend in both outcomes although the age effect is stronger on political 
orientation. The right panel illustrates the same relationship as the middle panel, except that we con-
trol for the reform orientation in the first-stage regressions. Because the reform orientation is an 
endogenous variable, there is a risk of over-controlling with this approach. The variable may pick up 
the effects of unobserved characteristics, and if the correlation between the outcomes is too strong, 
there may not be sufficient conditional variation in the political orientation to identify an age effect. 
However, the age effect on political orientation is only marginally affected by holding reform orien-
tation constant. One interpretation is that the differences in political orientations between the young 
(relatively more inclined to left-wing policies) and the old (relatively more inclined to right-wing 
policies) cannot be solely attributed to a habitation-induced status-quo preference by the latter.  
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Fig. 3. Reform orientation and political orientation by age 
Notes: The figure summarizes the mean vote by age and attitude groups across 305 referenda. In the left panel, the 
voting outcome is encoded as zero if the vote is in support of the status quo (often, but not always a no vote) 
and as one if the vote supports a change in legislation. In the two remaining panels, the voting outcome is 
encoded as zero if it is in line with the political right and one if it is in line with the political left. In the first two 
panels, we regress different voting outcomes against a battery of individual controls, referendum fixed effects 
and one-year-age-bin fixed effects. In the third panel, we use the political orientation outcome as the dependent 
variable and control for the reform orientation in addition to the other covariates. The point estimates (solid 
lines) and 95% confidence intervals (gray-shaded areas) are from local polynomial regressions (degree = 0) 
of the recovered age-bin fixed effects against (integer) age. Dashed lines are the mean outcome across all age 
groups.  
4.3 Age vs. cohort effects 
Another question concerning the origin of the generation gap that is central to our analysis is whether 
the age correlations documented above are causal in the sense that they reflect the effect of the aging 
of individuals or spurious in the sense that they capture correlated cohort effects. Individuals 
belonging to different birth cohorts had different experiences at similar stages of their lifecycles and 
may consequently have developed different values, attitudes and orientations. In fact, numerous 
social science studies have ascribed different tastes, values, and political preferences to distinct social 
generations (Alwin & McCammon, 2012; Foner, 1974). Figure 4 shows how the negative assocaition 
between political orientation and age directly maps to a positive assocaition between voters’ political 
orientation and birth year. 
Those born up until 1945 (tradtionalists) on average, vote more consistently with the positions of 
the political right whereas baby boomers (1946-1964) are much more postively inclined to left-wing 
policies. Generations X (1965-1976) and Y (from 1977), compared with the baby boomers, tend to 
lean somewhat more to the political right. Although this pattern is consistent with the 
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aforementioned social sciences literature, it is impossible to tell from a cross-sectional analysis if a 
generation gap is attributable to aging or cohort effects.  
Fig. 4. Political orientation by age and by cohort 
Notes:  This figure summarizes the mean vote by age across 305 referenda. The voting outcome is encoded as zero if 
it is in line with the political right and one if it is in line with the political left. In each panel, we regress the 
voting outcome against a battery of individual controls, referendum fixed effects and one-year-age-bin fixed 
effects (left) or one-year-birth-cohort fixed effects (right). The point estimates (solid lines) and 95% confi-
dence intervals (gray-shaded areas) are from local polynomial regressions (degree = 0) of the recovered fixed 
effects against age (left) and birth year (right). Dashed lines are the mean outcome across all age groups. 
To separate aging and cohort effects, our approach is to analyze how orientations change within co-
horts as they age. To this end, we tabulate the unconditional mean political attitude by cohorts and 
age groups in Table 3. Virtually all cohorts shift from a left to the right political orientation as they 
age. The exception are the earliest cohorts, which, however, are quite sparse in our data (they are 
already old when our observation period starts in 1980s). It is worth noting that Table 3 also reveals 
downward trends in age within groups of voters who voted for change or the status quo, once more 
indicating that habituation is an imperfect explanation for the generation gap. Age trends are also 
similar within referenda that won a majority or failed, which does not support a further alternative 
hypothesis that age effects could be driven by older voters being better at making choices that are in 
the interest of society as a whole. We also find downward age trends when differentiating by gender 
and periods.  
Thus, overall, one may be inclined to read the evidence presented in Table 3 as supporting the pres-
ence of aging effects. However, highlighting the nature of the APC conundrum, it is worth noting that 
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the consistent within-cohort age trend could well be attributable to period effects, i.e., a shift in the 
mean orientation over time. 
Tab. 3. Mean political orientation by age and other attributes 
Age 
20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s All 
All 0.537 0.512 0.496 0.489 0.471 0.45 0.448 0.46 0.489 
Status-quo vote 0.357 0.367 0.357 0.359 0.355 0.324 0.329 0.321 0.353 
Change vote 0.703 0.66 0.641 0.63 0.596 0.597 0.575 0.596 0.632 
Referendum won 0.591 0.56 0.544 0.545 0.523 0.519 0.508 0.548 0.543 
Referendum failed 0.492 0.473 0.456 0.444 0.429 0.393 0.399 0.379 0.444 
Female voter 0.548 0.52 0.504 0.501 0.479 0.455 0.463 0.471 0.498 
Male voter 0.529 0.503 0.488 0.478 0.464 0.446 0.435 0.451 0.48 
Period = 1980s 0.559 0.511 0.479 0.459 0.444 0.426 0.396 0.484 
Period = 1990s 0.555 0.533 0.507 0.496 0.49 0.475 0.484 0.545 0.51 
Period = 2000s 0.524 0.525 0.508 0.5 0.47 0.454 0.46 0.508 0.495 
Period = 2010s 0.493 0.473 0.479 0.486 0.467 0.435 0.427 0.424 0.468 
Cohort = 1890s 0.286 1 0.545 
Cohort = 1900s 0.451 0.434 0.551 0.445 
Cohort = 1910s 0.495 0.454 0.48 0.483 0.467 
Cohort = 1920s 0.466 0.47 0.46 0.445 0.418 0.46 
Cohort = 1930s 0.512 0.472 0.472 0.441 0.43 0.462 
Cohort = 1940s 0.515 0.49 0.5 0.46 0.446 0.478 
Cohort = 1950s 0.571 0.52 0.512 0.49 0.485 0.504 
Cohort = 1960s 0.552 0.532 0.486 0.495 0.515 
Cohort = 1970s 0.543 0.491 0.487 0.505 
Cohort = 1980s 0.504 0.481 0.493 
Cohort = 1990s 0.506 0.506 
Notes: Data cover 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. The political orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line 
with the political right and one if it is in line with the political left. A summary of left-wing attitudes by themes 
is in Table 1. Cells in the table show the unconditional mean vote by age group (columns) and the attributes 
(rows). Number of observations by cells are reported in Appendix I, Section 5. 
Figure 5 illustrates the intuition behind the separate identification of age and cohort effects in the 
unconstrained rank model described in Section 2. For this purpose, we convert the unconditional 
mean political orientations in the age group-cohort cells reported in Table 3 into within-period field 
ranks. Within each period (decade), each cohort is assigned a rank in the distribution of political ori-
entation in which left political orientations correspond to low ranks and right political orientations 
correspond to high ranks. As discussed in Section 2, this transformation removes period effects so 
that we can focus on the separation of age and cohort effects.  
We note that we do not observe the full voting life for any cohort (seven ten-year periods from the 
20s to the 80s, excluding sparsely populated older age groups), but at most four periods per cohort 
due to the limited longitudinal dimension of our data. Nevertheless, the pattern in the data is quite 
unambiguous. Cohorts generally begin their voting life with a left political orientation. In our data, 
we observe the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s birth cohorts in the first period in which they are 
Ahlfeldt, Maennig, Mueller – The generation gap in direct democracy 23 
entitled to vote (when they are in their 20s). All of them occupy a low orientation rank of one or two 
during this period, and all step up in the rank scale toward a more right-wing rank as they age in the 
subsequent periods. Likewise, cohorts that we observe for the first time at higher ages enter the data 
with higher ranks and then also climb the rank scale as they age. By the end of their voting lives (we 
set this to period 7 for consistency), the cohorts that we observe at that stage of their voting lives 
(1900s, 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s birth cohorts) are those with the most right-wing political orienta-
tion (ranks 7-9). In addition, they all occupy a lower political orientation rank the first time we ob-
serve them in the data.  
A casual inspection of Figure 5 further suggests that cohorts, on average, climb up the rank distribu-
tion by approximately one step each period. As discussed in Section 2, this is the upper-bound that 
we can expect from the aging effect. Figure 5 thus suggests that aging effects (and not correlated co-
hort effects) are likely to account for much of the generation gap documented above. We provide an 
econometric analysis of the unconstrained rank model to affirm this notion in the next section.  
Fig. 5. Cohort rank in political orientation distribution by period 
Notes: Data cover 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. The field rank (lowest rank to highest value) is computed as the 
rank in the distribution of unconditional means in political orientation of cohorts within periods (the values 
reported in Table 3). A summary of left-wing attitudes by themes is in Table 1. The temporal unit of observation 
is periods defined as decades. Our data cover four periods (1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s) and 10 birth 
cohorts (1900s, 1910s, …, 1990s). During the first/second/…/seventh periods a cohort is entitled to vote, vot-
ers are in their 20s/30s/…/80s. We ignore the remaining periods because the data for voters aged 90 and 
above are sparse. Cohorts are labeled when they first appear in our data. For example, the 1950-cohort is ob-
served first in their second voting period when they are in their 30s (during the 1980s) and then in three 
subsequent periods (3, 4, and 5) when they are in their 40s, 50s and 60s (during the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s).  
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5 Age and cohort effects in an unconstrained rank model 
5.1 Empirical implementation  
Throughout this section, we aggregate the individual data to five-year cohort-period cells using an 
approach that shares similarities with Mincer regression, which is a popular tool in labor economics 
(Rosen, 1992). To control for individual voter characteristics, we run first-stage regressions of the 
individual voting outcomes against a large set of individual characteristics and cohort-referendum 
effects, recover the latter, and collapse the data onto that level. The first-stage regression results are 
presented in Section 6 of Appendix I. The result is a panel data set of adjusted voting outcome pro-
pensities (the left-hand side in equation (3)) in which birth cohorts 𝑐 = (1895 − 99, 1900 −
04, … , 1995 − 1999) are observed over periods 𝑡 = (1980 − 84, 1985 − 89, … , 2015 − 17). In each 
of the eight periods, we observe 14 age groups 𝑎 = 𝑡 − c = (20 − 24, 25 − 29, … , 85 − 89). We drop 
cohort-period cells for older age groups because these are sparsely populated with survey observa-
tions.5 As discussed in Section 2, the marginal aging effect in the rank model has intuitive bounds (- 1 
to 1). To maintain the intuitive interpretability in the aggregated (to five-year age groups) data, we 
rescale the rank measure to ?̃?𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 × 5 − 2, where 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 is the rank of a five-year age group in the 
distribution of voting propensities within a period (1-14). This transformation ensures that voters 
can climb up as many steps on the rank scale as they can age in years over their voting life and that 
the rank of a five-year age group (e.g. ?̃?𝑐,𝑡 = 3 for the first-ranked age group) corresponds to the 
mean rank of five-integer-age groups with the same relative location in the distribution (e.g., ranks 
one to five).  
After applying the adjusted rank transformation to the adjusted voting propensities, we use the data 
set to estimate a version of equation (4). We do not have theoretical priors regarding the functional 
form of the aging effect 𝑚(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡). Orientations and attitudes may change linearly in time or change 
more rapidly at some stages of the lifecycle than at others. To obtain estimates of the lifecycle-specific 
average field rank (lowest rank to the largest orientation value) conditional on arbitrary cohort ef-
fects as well as on marginal aging effects that are specific to age groups ?̃?, we estimate the following 
empirical specification: 
5  For a handful of cohort-period observations, we impute the propensity of voting outcomes due to missing 
values. This is required to ensure the comparability of the rank measure across periods. See Section 7 in the 
Appendix for details.  
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?̃?𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽?̃?𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑐,?̃? + 𝜖𝑐,𝑡,?̃?, (5) 
where 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡, as before, is the age of cohort c in period t, 𝛽?̃? is the marginal effect of aging for age 
group ?̃?, 𝜑𝑐,?̃? is a cohort effect, and 𝜖𝑐,𝑡,?̃? is an error term. We estimate this model in a series of locally 
weighted (linear) regressions (LWR) (Cleveland & Devlin, 1988). In each regression, we weight all 
observations by their distance from age group ?̃? using weights that are defined by a Gaussian kernel 
of the form 
𝑤𝑐,𝑡,?̃? =
1
𝜅√2𝜋
exp (−
1
2
(
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡,𝑐 − ?̃? 
𝜅
)
2
) , (6) 
where 𝜅 is the bandwidth defined as 𝜅 = 𝜇𝜆, 𝜆 is the Silverman rule-of-thumb bandwidth and 𝜇 is a 
multiplier.6 We note that before we run the LWR, we run an additional auxiliary regression of ranks 
against cohort fixed effects to remove any time-invariant components from the data.  
Using this empirical approach, we obtain a local estimate of the marginal effect of aging ?̂??̃? for each 
age group. Age-group-?̃?-specific predicted (conditional on cohort effects) ranks are recovered as 
?̂??̃?𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 + ?̅?, where ?̅? is the mean over the cohort effect of any cohort at any period. Specification 
obviously (5) collapses to the standard linear parametric model as 𝑤𝑐,𝑡,?̃? approaches a uniform dis-
tribution (𝜇 → ∞). 
5.2 Aging effects 
In the first implementation of the LWR approach described above, we estimate the effect of aging on 
reform orientation and political orientation across all referenda. The results are presented in Fig-
ure 6 for the rule-of-thumb bandwidth (𝜇 = 1). In the Appendix, we also present results using larger 
bandwidth multipliers because non-parametric estimation of derivatives (here 𝜕𝑅𝑐,𝑡/𝜕𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡) often 
requires more smoothing than levels. 
Up to the age of 70, the general trend is that voters increasingly support the status quo as they age. 
Further aging, however, is associated with increasing support for change. Over the entire voting life-
time there is a significant but moderate increase in the mean reform orientation rank by 12 steps, 
which corresponds to 0.18 (= 12/(85 − 20)) ranks per year. The marginal aging effects are mostly 
close to zero and even negative for the oldest age groups. They are not statistically significant at the 
95% level for any age group. 
6 The (Silverman, 1986) rule defines the bandwidth as 𝜆 = 1.06 × 𝜎𝑁−
1
5.
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In keeping with the cross-sectional effects in Figure 2, the aging effects on political orientation are 
larger. The political orientation continuously changes from left to right as cohorts age. The mean po-
litical orientation rank increases by 41 from 19 to 60 over the course of the lifecycle. This corre-
sponds to more than 0.6 ranks per year. The marginal aging effects are positive (and often significant 
at the 95% level). There appears to be a particularly strong shift in the political orientations when 
voters are in their 60s, when the marginal effect is close to the upper bound of one, confirming the 
retirement effect suggested by the cross-sectional analysis in Section 4.  
Fig. 6. Semi-non-parametric aging effect on reform and political orientation rank 
Notes:  This figure is based on individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Upper panels 
show the predicted rank from locally weighted polynomial (degree = 1) regressions (LWR) of reform/political 
orientation rank against voter age while controlling for cohort effects. Before running the LWR, cohort fixed 
effects are removed in auxiliary linear regressions. LWRs are weighted by distance from an age bin (the black 
dots) using a Gaussian kernel and a Silverman rule-of-thumb bandwidth. Bottom panels show the marginal 
effect of age on the orientation rank. Individual data are aggregated to the age-group-period level. Reform [po-
litical] orientation rank is the rank in the distribution of mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within 
five-year age (20-24, 25-29,..., 85-89) x five-year period (1980-1984, 1985-1989,..., 2015-2017) cells. Reform 
[political] orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in status-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform 
[political] orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with the status quo [the political right] and one if 
the vote is in line with a vote for change [the political left]. The reform [political] orientation is adjusted in a 
first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against a battery of first-stage controls and referen-
dum-age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to generate the rank measures used here. 95% confidence 
intervals (bars) based on standard errors clustered on cohort fixed effects.  
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An increase in the bandwidth multiplier results in a more linear age effect, as expected. As the band-
width increases, the marginal aging effects on the reform orientation remain insignificant whereas 
the marginal aging effects on the political orientation all eventually become significantly different 
from zero and statistically indistinguishable from one (see Section 8 in Appendix I). As the bandwidth 
approaches infinity, we obtain the linear parametric rank models (4) and (10) reported in Table 4, in 
which we also report models excluding cohort effects (1, 3, 7, 9) and individual controls (1, 2, 7, 8). 
One insight from Table 4 is that controlling for individual effects (in the first-stage) has a minor effect 
on the orientation ranks; if anything, the aging effect increases. Thus, the aging effect is independent 
of income, housing tenure (renter vs. owner), marital status, number of children, and many other 
individual attributes that may change as voters age.  
More central to the research question, Table 4 also reveals that controlling for cohort effects reduces 
the age effect. The age effect on the reform orientation rank, in the preferred models controlling for 
voter characteristics (4 vs. 3), decreases by more than one-third. The age effect also changes from 
being significant to being insignificant. For the aging effect on the political orientation rank, the effect 
of controlling for cohort effects, at –16%, is smaller in relative terms. Conditional on cohort effects, 
the aging effect on the orientation rank, at 0.62, is large, highly significant, and consistent with the 
non-parametric results in Figure 6. In keeping with the non-parametric estimates, we find that the 
aging effect on the political orientation rank is particularly strong among older age groups (model 
12). 
In terms of political orientations, the overall evidence suggests that as cohorts age, they become less 
supportive of left-wing policies and more supportive of right-wing policies. Evidence of an aging ef-
fect on the reform orientation is weak at best. The results thus support the notion from the more 
descriptive analyses in Section 4. The generation gap in political orientation largely appears to orig-
inate from aging effects and not just from correlated cohort effects. Moreover, an increasing status-
quo preference due to habituation does not appear to be the primary driver of the aging effect on the 
political orientation because in that case, larger effects on the reform orientation would have been 
expected.  
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Tab. 4. Parametric aging effects on reform and political orientation rank 
Reform orientation rank (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age (years) 0.301*** 
(0.104) 
0.146 
(0.196) 
0.291*** 
(0.106) 
0.187 
(0.197) 
0.406 
(0.389) 
0.060 
(0.386) 
r2 0.091 0.326 0.085 0.371 0.459 0.343 
Political orientation rank (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Age (years) 0.720*** 
(0.081) 
0.576*** 
(0.156) 
0.738*** 
(0.071) 
0.617*** 
(0.201) 
0.583* 
(0.292) 
0.920*** 
(0.232) 
r2 0.519 0.737 0.545 0.737 0.437 0.798 
Cohort effects - Yes - Yes Yes Yes 
Controls - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ages All All All All < 50 >= 50 
N 112 112 112 112 48 64 
Notes:  The output is inferred from individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Individual 
data are aggregated to the age-group-period level. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank in the distri-
bution of mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x five-year pe-
riod (1980-1984, 1985-1989,..., 2010-2014) cells. Prior to the LWR, cohort effects are removed after running 
an auxiliary regression of the orientation rank against cohort fixed effects where indicated. Reform [political] 
orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in status-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] 
orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with the status quo [the political right] and one if the vote is 
in line with a vote for change [the political left]. The addition of controls means that the reform [political] 
orientation is adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against a battery of first-
stage controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to generate the rank measures 
used here. Standard errors are clustered on cohort fixed effects where included. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Figure 7 replicates the analysis separately for referenda in the four different attitude groups defined 
in Table 1. We focus on the level effects for brevity (the marginal effects are reported in Section 8 in 
Appendix I).  
We find a relatively strong effect of aging on ideological attitudes. As they age, cohorts’ attitudes shift 
from liberal (left-wing) to conservative (right-wing). Controlling for cohort effects, the average rank 
increases by approximately 40 ranks over one’s voting life, which corresponds to approximately two-
thirds of a rank for every year of aging. Within referenda in this attitude group, the effect of aging on 
reform orientation ranks is smaller and more ambiguous as cohorts over their voting life become 
first more reform-affine and then more reform-averse.  
Within the environmentalist attitude group, there is a similar transition from left-wing (high priority 
to environment protection) to right-wing attitudes (low priority). The age trend is fairly linear, im-
plying that changes in attitudes occur at an approximately constant rate over one’s voting life. By 
contrast, the shift from a pro-young (left-wing) to a pro-elderly (right-wing) attitude occurs quite 
sharply near the retirement age, which, as previously discussed, is plausible given that many reform 
projects in this group do not benefit those who have already retired (fewer maximum working hours, 
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earlier retirement age, minimum wages, etc.). Within both the environmentalist and generational at-
titude groups, the aging effect on reform orientation are slightly muted but generally similar to the 
effects on attitudes. 
The aging effect on fiscal attitude is non-monotonic. Until the age of 40, voters in relative terms are 
increasingly more inclined to support fiscally progressive policies (left-wing). Over their remaining 
life, voters gravitate back toward a greater preference for regressive policies. The aging effect on the 
reform orientation rank within the same set of referenda is more monotonic. Voters, as they age, 
increasingly vote for change in order to support policies that have fiscally regressive implications.  
Overall, the age trends in attitude ranks controlling for cohort effects are quite consistent with the 
cross-sectional age effect on attitudes reported in Figure 2, once again suggesting that genuine aging 
effects drive the generation gap. A comparison between the age effects on the political orientation 
ranks and the reform orientation ranks within the ideological and fiscal attitude groups suggests that 
the motivation behind the voters’ shift in orientation is more likely to be utility-maximization than 
habituation. The strong retirement effect on generational attitudes further supports this interpreta-
tion. Nevertheless, given the strong collinearity between reform orientation and political orientation 
within the environmentalist and generational attitude groups (see Table 2), it is difficult to formally 
reject the utility-maximization hypothesis in favor of the habituation hypotheses within these 
groups.  
To save space, we leave the presentation of the results from linear parametric models that corre-
spond to Figure 7 to Appendix I (Section 8). The results substantiate the interpretations presented 
here. 
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Fig. 7. Semi-non-parametric estimates of rank by age and attitude group 
 
Notes: This figure is based on individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. All panels show 
the predicted rank from locally weighted polynomial (degree 1) regressions (LWR) of reform/political orien-
tation rank against voter age controlling cohort effects. LWRs are weighted by distance from an age bin (the 
black dots) using a Gaussian kernel and a Silverman rule-of-thumb bandwidth. Individual data are aggregated 
to the age-group-period level. Prior to the LWR, cohort effects are removed after running an auxiliary regres-
sion of the orientation rank against cohort fixed effects. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank in the 
distribution of mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x five-year 
period (1980-1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2010-2014) cells. Reform [political] orientation ranks are field ranks that 
increase in status-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] orientation is encoded as zero if the vote 
is in line with the status quo [the political right] and one if the vote is in line with a vote for change [the political 
left]. The reform [political] orientation is adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orienta-
tion against a battery of first-stage controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects, in which the latter are used 
to generate the rank measures used here. 95% confidence intervals (bars) based on standard errors clustered 
on cohort fixed effects. LWR estimates of the marginal aging effects are in Section 8.2 in the Appendix. 
5.3 Cohort effects 
Although age is a significant determinant of voter orientations, the significant increase in the explan-
atory power of the models in Table 4 once cohort effects are added also suggests a role for cohort 
effects. The figure below illustrates the effects of cohort affiliation on reform orientation and political 
orientation. To this end, we report the unconditional mean orientation (adjusted for individual char-
acteristics) ranks by cohort group as well as the conditional means controlling for age. The latter are 
recovered from regressions of orientation ranks against age and cohort effects. 
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Figure 8 shows remarkable changes in voter orientations across cohort groups, which generally seem 
to coincide with popular definitions of social generations. The traditionalists (until 1945) tend to 
support the status quo and right-wing policies; the baby boomers (1946-1964) have the strongest 
inclination to support changes in legislation in general and left-wing policies in particular; generation 
X (1965-1976), and even more so generation Y (from 1977), are more similar to the traditionalists 
in terms of reform orientation and political orientation, broadly defined (Smola & Sutton, 2002). No-
tably, the cohort effects on the political orientation ranks are generally smaller (except for the latest 
cohort) once age is controlled for. The implication is that some of the voting behavioral differences 
across generations that have been observed in past decades are attributable to the generations’ being 
in different stages in their lifecycles rather than differences in shared experiences. For example, much 
of the difference in political orientation between the traditionalists and the baby boomers can be 
attributed to the fact the former, at any given point in time, are older than the latter. Nevertheless, 
even conditional on age effects, cohort effects remain quantitatively important. Controlling for age, 
traditionalists born in 1935-1939, compared with baby boomers born in 1955-1959, are, on average 
20 steps higher in the political orientation rank distribution (more right-wing). At an average aging 
effect on the orientation rank of 0.62 (Table 4, model 10), this cohort effect is equivalent to the effect 
of a cohort aging by 32 years (approximately half of a voting life).  
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Fig. 8. Cohort effects on orientation ranks 
Notes:  The output is inferred from individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Data are 
aggregated to the age-group-period level. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank in the distribution of 
mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x five-year period (1980-
1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2010-2014) cells. Reform [political] orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in sta-
tus-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with 
the status quo [the political right] and one if the vote is in line with a vote for change [the political left]. The 
reform [political] orientation is adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against 
a battery of first-stage controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to generate 
the rank measures used here. Unconditional cohort effects are the mean orientation ranks by cohort. Condi-
tional cohort effects are recovered from regressions of orientation ranks against age group effects and cohort 
effects. Vertical dotted lines bond the social generation of “baby boomers”. Earlier cohorts are “traditionalists”. 
Later cohorts belong to “generation X” and “generation Y”. 
Analogous to Figure 8, we illustrate the conditional and unconditional mean cohort ranks by cohort 
and attitude group in Figure 9. The distribution of unconditional mean ideological attitude ranks by 
cohort is consistent with a conservative attitude that is often ascribed to the traditionalist generation 
(Pew Research Center, 2011). However, once we control for age effects, ideological attitudes vary 
only moderately across cohorts, suggesting that the traditionalists’ conservative attitude – at least 
with regard to votes in Swiss referenda – is attributable to the generation’s age and not cohort-spe-
cific values. For the other attitude groups, the cohort affiliation net of the age effect is more important. 
Starting with the baby boomers, cohorts have a stronger environmentalist attitude, possibly because 
Ahlfeldt, Maennig, Mueller – The generation gap in direct democracy 33 
of experiencing a more prominent public debate on environmental issues during their formative 
years. A similar transition is evident for generational attitudes although at a smoother rate. From 
1930 to the 1950, birth cohorts have gradually become more sympathetic to policies that – in relative 
terms – benefit the workforce and families with dependent children (the young). In terms of fiscal 
attitudes, the baby boomers stand out because they, more than other generations, are willing to sup-
port progressive fiscal policies, possibly because of strong preferences for social equality. In general, 
these results substantiate descriptive evidence from US surveys (Pew Research Center, 2018). 
Fig. 9. Cohort effects by attitude groups 
 
Notes:  The output is inferred from individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Data are 
aggregated to the age-group–period level. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank in the distribution of 
mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x five-year period (1980-
1984, 1985-1989,..., 2010-2014) cells. Reform [political] orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in sta-
tus-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with 
the status quo (the political right) and one if the vote is in line with a vote for change [the political left]. The 
reform [political] orientation is adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against 
a battery of first-stage controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects, in which the latter are used to generate 
the rank measures used here. Unconditional cohort effects are the mean orientation ranks by cohort. Condi-
tional cohort effects are recovered from regressions of orientation ranks against age group effects and cohort 
effects. Vertical dotted lines bond the social generation of “baby boomers”. Earlier cohorts are “traditionalists”. 
Later cohorts belong to “generation X” and “generation Y”. N is the number of referenda per attitude group. 
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5.4 Robustness and extensions 
In this section, we summarize the results of several additional pieces of analysis that substantiate the 
interpretations presented thus far and whose detailed presentation, to save space, we relegate to 
Appendix I, Section 9. First, we estimate the effects of aging on the political orientation rank, control-
ling for reform orientation rank (and cohort effects) and vice versa. The results further substantiate 
the impression that compared with the habitation hypothesis, the utility-maximization hypothesis 
has more support in the data with regard to explaining the generation gap in direct democracy. Sec-
ond, we examine the serial correlation in cohorts’ orientation ranks. We find that lagged political 
orientation ranks are strong predictors of contemporary political orientation ranks, suggesting a role 
for cohort effects. However, we also find that this serial correlation is largely attributable to serial 
correlation in age, providing further support for the importance of aging in addition to cohort effects. 
Third, we show that in our data, the time-invariant components in orientation ranks (cohort effects) 
are correlated with age. This is a source of bias in the cross-sectional analysis of age effects, highlight-
ing the importance of exploring panel data to control for cohort effects. Fourth, we back out the im-
plied effect of aging on reform orientation and political orientation levels combining the estimated 
aging effects on orientation ranks (from Table 4, fourth column) with estimates of the relationship 
between orientation ranks and orientation levels. Accordingly, aging by one year reduces the proba-
bility of voting for change by 0.08 percentage points and the probability of voting for a left-wing pol-
icy by 0.13 percentage points. These effects are roughly consistent with, although marginally smaller 
than, the aging effects obtained from individual-level regressions of orientation levels against indi-
vidual controls, referendum effects, and generation (those defined in Figure 8) effects. Fifth, and re-
lated to the previous point, not controlling for period effects (explicitly or implicitly by means of the 
rank transformation) and instead controlling for arbitrary cohort effects results in aging effects on 
orientation levels that are substantially larger. To the extent that period effects capture the effect of 
average population aging on the average electoral outcome, the aging effects identified from changes 
in the relative positioning within periods are of a conservative nature.  
6 Impact of population aging on direct democracy outcomes 
The results presented thus far indicate a causal effect of aging on voter orientation. The implication 
is that in aging societies, voters become more resistant to change and more inclined to support poli-
cies that are commonly associated with the political right. In particular, voter attitudes are expected 
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to become less liberal and environmentalist and more pro-elderly. To gauge the quantitative rele-
vance of population aging in a rapidly aging country such as Switzerland, it is useful to approximate 
the effect that population aging had on voter orientations over the course of our study period.  
We begin by presenting the average voting outcome ?̅?𝑎,𝑡 of age group a in  period t as a function of 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑎 and an arbitrary age group-period effect 𝑏𝑎,𝑡: 
?̅?𝑎,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑎,𝑡 + 𝑔(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑎,𝑡) (7) 
The mean vote in the voting population is defined by: 
?̅?𝑡 = ∑ 𝑛𝑎,𝑡?̅?𝑎,𝑡
𝑎
, (8) 
where 𝑛𝑎,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑎,𝑡/𝑁𝑡 and 𝑁𝑎,𝑡 is the number of voters within age group a in period t and 𝑁𝑡 = ∑ 𝑁𝑎,𝑡𝑎  
is the number of voters in a period. In our thought experiment, we compare the average vote to a 
counterfactual average vote ?̂̅?𝑡 in a hypothetical scenario in which the population does not age.  
?̂̅?𝑡 = ∑ ?̂?𝑎?̅?𝑎,𝑡
𝑎
, (9) 
where ∑ ?̂?𝑎 =𝑎 ∑ 𝑛𝑎,𝑡 = 1𝑎  and ?̂?𝑎 are time-invariant shares of age groups within the total number of 
voters. The effect of a change in the age distribution on the average vote is then simply the difference 
between the counterfactual vote and the observed average vote.  
∆𝑉𝑡 = ?̂̅?𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡 , (10) 
Substituting equations (7-9) into (10) yields: 
∆𝑉𝑡 = ∑ (?̂?𝑎 − 𝑛𝑎,𝑡  ) 𝑔(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑎)
𝑎
 (11) 
In Section 2, we discussed at length that 𝑔(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑎) cannot be estimated without constraints. However, 
we estimated the causal effect of age on the orientation rank, i.e., the rank a cohort occupies in the 
distribution of votes within a period. Since the orientation rank is a function of the orientation (the 
mean vote), we can describe the average relationship (across all periods) between the orientation 
rank ?̅?𝑎 and age as ?̅?𝑎 = 𝑅(?̅?𝑎(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑎)) = ?̅?(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑎). Solving for ?̅?𝑎 = 𝑅
−1 (?̅?(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡)) and substitut-
ing into equations (8) and (9) and then into (10) yields  
∆𝑉𝑡 = ∑ (?̂?𝑎 − 𝑛𝑎,𝑡  )𝑅
−1(?̅?(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑎))
𝑐
 (12) 
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Consistent with the analysis in Section 6, we analyze the data at the level of five-year bins; i.e., periods 
are defined as 𝑡 = (1980-1984, 1985-1989,..., 2015-2017) and age groups are defined as 𝑎 = (20-24, 
25-29, ..., 85-89). To quantitatively assess the impact of population aging on reform orientation and 
political orientation, we hold the counterfactual age distribution constant at the levels of the first 
period, i.e., ?̂?𝑎 = 𝑛𝑐,𝑡=1980−1984. As an approximation of ?̅?(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑎) we use the predicted values from 
the LWR estimates displayed in Figure 6 (all referenda) and Figure 7 (by attitude groups). Further, 
we approximate 𝑅−1(?̅?(∙)) in a local polynomial (degree = 0) regression of the adjusted orientation 
(the mean vote controlling for individual covariates) against the orientation rank measures used 
throughout Section 6. Note that in computing ?̂?𝑎 and 𝑛𝑎, we use the age distribution as recorded in 
the survey data (as opposed to the aging of the total population) because in this manner, we implicitly 
account for the potential effects of aging on voter turnout (Goerres, 2007). 
The aging effects ∆𝑉𝑡 by period and attitude groups are illustrated in Figure 10. As expected, given 
the evidence in Section 6, the effect of population aging was to increase the share of votes for the legal 
status quo as well as right-wing policies. The effect on the latter is somewhat stronger than on the 
former. In relative terms, the effects are greatest on referenda in the generational attitude group. 
This is the combined effect of attitudes in this group changing sharply once voters age beyond 50 and 
the most populous cohorts aging from below 50 to above 50 over the course of our study period. 
Compared with the other attitude groups, the effects on referendum outcomes in the fiscal attitude 
group differs in that there is a positive effect on the share of pro-change votes.  
Overall, the effects of population aging are quantitatively relevant although not yet dramatic. In rel-
ative terms, the support of left policies, on average, would have been 2.4% higher in 2017 (relative 
to the mean share) if the age distribution had remained constant at 1981 levels. Within the genera-
tional attitude group, support for pro-young policies would have been 5.3% higher. To further assess 
the effect population aging had on direct democracy outcomes in Switzerland over the past four dec-
ades, we merge the effects displayed in the right panel of Figure 8 with the actual referendum out-
comes by period and attitude group. Computing the counterfactual outcome without ageing, we iden-
tify five referenda for which the outcome would have been different (the left-wing instead of right-
wing position option would have been chosen), all of which occurred since 2004. This is just 1.7% of 
the 305 referenda held since 1981 but 5.2% of the referenda held since 2004. Thus, the effects of 
population aging are limited and have not been decisive until recently. However, the effects will ac-
cumulate as population aging progresses unless the established age-orientation relationship 
changes. As discussed at the end of Section 6, it is also worth recalling that the aging effects we used 
in the counterfactual analysis are likely conservative estimates.  
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Fig. 10. Predicted effect of population aging on reform and political orientation 
 
Notes: We analyze the micro data at the level of five-year bins; i.e., periods are defined as 𝑡 = (1980-1984, 1985-1989, 
..., 2015-2017) and age groups are defined as 𝑎 = (20-24, 25-29, ..., 85-89). The predicted orientation is the 
difference in the mean predicted vote by age groups weighted by the shares of total voters between a scenario 
with the actual age distribution and a counterfactual scenario in which the age distribution is set to the 1980-
84 level. Predicted votes are generated using the non-linear effect of age on the orientation rank (see Figures 
6 and 7), and a non-linear mapping of orientation ranks to orientations obtained using pooled local polynomial 
(degree = 0) regressions. Age group shares are from the representative VoxIt surveys. 
7 Conclusion 
We document the existence of a generation gap in direct democracy outcomes across a wide range of 
topics using a pooled data set of postelection surveys covering 305 referenda held in Switzerland 
since 1981. We demonstrate that older voters are generally more likely to resist reform projects. 
Whereas young voters are more likely to support policies associated with the political left, older vot-
ers are move favorable toward policies associated with the political right. In particular, older voters 
express more conservative attitudes with regard to decisions on constitutional order, foreign affairs, 
or security policy. Older voters are also less likely to support policies that seek to protect the envi-
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ronment or benefit the working population, including families with children. The relationship be-
tween fiscal attitudes and age is non-monotonic. Comparing younger and older voters, those in their 
30s and 40s have the greatest taste for policies with progressive distributional consequences. 
Using a novel unconstrained rank model to separately identify age and cohort effects, we demon-
strate a causal aging effect that cannot be attributed to correlated birth cohort effects. However, co-
hort affiliation is a significant determinant of voting behavior. Controlling for age, the “baby boomer” 
generation (1945-1964) stands out relative to earlier and later generations in that they are more 
likely to support change in general, and in particular, they are likely to support policies that seek to 
protect the environment, benefit the working population, and have progressive distributional conse-
quences. If aging and cohort effects are not estimated conditional on each other, either effect is over-
estimated, highlighting the importance of exploiting the longitudinal dimension in the analysis of po-
litical economy outcomes. Our results further suggest that an increasing status-quo orientation due 
to habituation is an insufficient explanation for the age-related pattern in the data. The evidence, 
instead, suggests that voters make deliberate choices that maximize their expected utility conditional 
on their stage in the lifecycle.  
One implication of our results is that population aging, one of the major global trends since the second 
half of the 20th century, has specifically affected direct democracy outcomes and perhaps the political 
economy more generally. Using a lower-bound estimate of the population aging effect, a counterfac-
tual analysis identifies five referenda (5%) held since 2004 for which the majority vote would have 
been different if the age distribution had remained constant at the 1981 level.  
As population aging progresses, reform projects that are less attractive to older voters will probably 
become less likely to win a majority. Such projects include policies in which the distributional conse-
quences directly depend on age, e.g., policies that improve working conditions or support families 
with dependent children. The prospects of reform projects with long-run benefits and short-run 
costs, such as climate change mitigation, may also be affected. 
The implication is that direct democracy outcomes will increasingly depart from ideal decisions that 
would maximize the net present value of a (future) individual who is about to be born into society 
and will experience the consequences of a decision over his or her entire life cycle (Messner & 
Polborn, 2004). This raises the question of whether decisions on reform projects in which the ex-
pected net present value differs across generations should be based on cost-benefit analyses instead 
of referenda (Osborne & Turner, 2010). Alternatively, the generation gap in direct democracy may 
be addressed by passing on the costs of reform projects to future generations through debt financing, 
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or by giving a stronger political voice to children, either by lowering the voting age or by having par-
ents vote on their behalf.  
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1 Introduction 
This appendix provides additional information on the data used in this study, includes auxiliary re-
sults, and complements our primary analysis by adding robustness checks and model extensions. 
Although this appendix replicates some text from the main paper for reasons of clarity, we note that 
it is not meant to stand alone. 
2 Direct democracy in Switzerland 
Direct democracy has been an established tool for making collective decisions in Switzerland since 
1848. Obligatory and facultative referenda are a form of the right to veto Acts of Parliament. Adjudi-
cations concerning changes to the constitution and the ratification of international treaties must, by 
law, be put to public votes. All other adjunctions may be subject to facultative referenda although 
their implementation requires the collection of at least 50,000 signatures of eligible voters within a 
100-day period. Whereas obligatory referenda as well demand a double majority to be accepted, fac-
ultative referenda only require a simple majority of the electorate. 
Citizens who want to implement a popular initiative that facilitates amendments to the constitution 
must gather at least 100,000 signatures of eligible voters within an 18-month period. Occasionally, 
government authorities propose a counter initiative or alternative version to the original initiative 
on the same referendum ballot. For either the popular initiative, counter initiative, or alternative 
 London School of Economics and Political Sciences (LSE) and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR),
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, g.ahlfeldt@lse.ac.uk, www.ahlfeldt.com
♠ University of Hamburg, Department of Economics, Chair of Economic Policy, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Ham-
burg, wolfgang.maennig@uni-hamburg.de
♦ University of Hamburg, Department of Economics, Chair of Economic Policy, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Ham-
burg, steffen.mueller@uni-hamburg.de
Ahlfeldt, Maennig, Mueller – The generation gap in direct democracy 2 
proposal to be accepted, a double majority is required (a majority of the electorate and a majority of 
the cantons). Nevertheless, the electorate decides individually on each referendum. The acceptance 
of two alternative versions on the same ballot hereby builds a special case, whose implications are 
determined ex ante by governmental and electoral campaign authorities. 
In general, referenda on the federal level are held four times a year, with votes on up to ten to twelve 
referenda. Citizens are not required to register, and prior to each vote, every eligible voter receives 
the respective ballot documentation by mail with detailed material on the relevant referenda. These 
information include inter alia the pro and con arguments for each proposition, the estimated benefits 
and financial consequences, and optional information on the parliamentary debate and outside opin-
ions by interest groups. Consequently, Swiss citizens have easy access to information regarding each 
referendum both through distributed information material and general discussion in the media. We 
therefore assume that the electorate is able to make informed decisions regarding the referenda un-
der consideration.  
The Swiss democratic system is rooted far back in history; thus, the Swiss have more than 150 years 
of experience exercising their political rights at the federal level. Women had no voting rights until 
1971, which was years before our study period begins. Before March 1991, the eligible voter had to 
be at least 20 years old. To accommodate this fact, we only consider survey answers by voters aged 
20 years or older.  
3 Data and empirical specification 
3.1 Sources  
Our empirical analysis uses standardized repeated cross-sectional sample surveys for each referen-
dum. Beginning in 1977, VOX surveys were conducted in the form of representative samples of ap-
proximately 1,000 eligible voters following each referendum. These telephone interviews take place 
during the three weeks following a referendum and cover three different categories of variables. 
First, questions regarding people’s actual voting behavior and decisions with regard to the referen-
dum under consideration, e.g. whether the person voted, what the person voted for, and whether she 
was well informed on the matter. Second, questions regarding individual political attitudes and vot-
ing behavior in general, e.g. party identification, trust in the government, participation frequency. 
Third, information on socio-economic data, e.g. age, gender, education level, income, home owner-
ship, household size, marital status and geographical variables. 
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The VOX surveys changed significantly over time, which leads to substantial problems when we con-
sider a set of referenda from different periods. To render these surveys comparable across time, the 
department of political science at the University of Geneva standardized the VOX surveys. These so 
called harmonized VoxIt surveys cover virtually all referenda since 1981. The data combine a stand-
ardized set of variables from the VOX surveys with official information regarding the corresponding 
referendum, e.g. results, turnout, government and party endorsement.  
In 2016, the VOX project was replaced by the so-called VOTO surveys. The Swiss Federal Council 
announced public bidding, and the new institutions in charge of the postvote surveys were the Swiss 
Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS), the Centre for Democracy Aarau (ZDA), and the 
LINK Institute for Market and Social Research. The VoxIt and VOTO surveys ask very similar ques-
tions. However, to include both survey data in our analysis, we harmonize the corresponding encod-
ing of possible answers as presented in Section 3.3.1 
It is important to emphasize that survey data suffer from several weaknesses. Moreover, voting be-
havior and policy preferences may be subject to specific bias and fallacies (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 
2001; Fowler & Margolis, 2014; Krosnick, 1999). Survey respondents may not have acquired suffi-
cient information or simply may not have formed an opinion regarding specific questions and thus 
may not respond at all. Moreover, although people are aware of their guaranteed anonymity, scien-
tists have noted a tendency to reply in a “politically correct” manner (Morris, 2001). However, an-
other advantage of the VOX surveys is that they allow specific questions to be answered by indicating 
“Not Specified” or “Don’t Know/Not Sure”. This should mitigate the probability of the aforementioned 
bias (Groothuis & Whitehead, 2002; Krosnick, Alwin, & Krosniek, 1989). 
Due to the long tradition of extensive political rights in Switzerland, citizens are experienced and 
used to communicating and expressing their political beliefs in the form of public votes and opinion 
polls. Correspondingly, every eligible voter automatically receives detailed information on each ref-
erendum, which is why we assume that the electorate is able to make informed decisions on each 
referendum (Funk & Gathmann, 2015). 
1  FORS is the Swiss national Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences. It maintains a national social science 
data archive and facilitates access to official statistical data. For more information on the VOX, VoxIt and 
VOTO surveys, see www.forscenter.ch and http://www.voto.swiss. 
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With regard to the extensively practiced form of direct democracy in Switzerland, we must also con-
sider the possible effects of ‘vote fatigue’. Because of the long tradition and acceptance of public votes 
in combination with the rather small number of referenda per year, we assume the potential effects 
of vote fatigue to be of less concern to our analysis (Funk & Gathmann, 2015). 
A great advantage of the postvote surveys is that we use only information on voting behavior associ-
ated with real political and financial implications instead of responses to hypothetical survey ques-
tions. The electorate therefore has an incentive to answer truthfully because the official postvote 
survey analysis can be expected to affect the government’s future policy course. We furthermore re-
strict our analysis to the electorate who actually voted on the referenda under consideration. Hence, 
voters who answered the VOX surveys should not be prone to mask their true votes and political 
beliefs (Funk & Gathmann, 2015).  
All data concerning the official referenda outcomes, e.g. voting results, turnout, topic, etc., come from 
the Federal Chancellery of Switzerland and can be found on their official web page 
(https://www.bfs.admin.ch). We also made use of the SWISSVOTES database, which provides the 
same data on Swiss referenda as the SFSO (http://swissvotes.ch). SWISSVOTES comprises several 
research projects. It is a service provided by the Institute of Political Science at the University of Bern 
and the Annual book of Swiss Politics (Année Politique Suisse). It was founded by the Swiss Confed-
eration and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) and is supported by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation (SNSF). 
We note that the minimum voter age in Switzerland was lowered from 20 to 18 in 1991. To maintain 
a consistent definition over the study period, we exclude responses from voters below the age of 20. 
Moreover, we treat two specific initiatives and their counter-proposals as not mutually exclusive 
(VoxIt Nr. 781, 782). This means that we code a double yes vote as well as a yes vote in either one of 
the initiatives as only one observation and drop the other.  We also drop one of the observations for 
double no votes. We apply the same procedure to one “unofficial counter-proposal” (VoxIt Nr. 711 
and 712). 
Lastly, the surveys for the referenda until 1985 did not ask for an integer for the respondent’s age, 
but for age classes of different intervals. There are 17 referenda included in our analysis subject to 
this matter. We predict an integer value of the individuals’ age using a procedure that we describe in 
Appendix I Section 3.2.  
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3.2 Imputation of age integers within age categories 
We first apply a polynomial regression on an individual’s age by education level, homeowner status, 
and further control variables for all 12 pooled VoxIt survey data from 1985. We then sort the obser-
vations by age class and predicted age. Individuals with a low predicted age are sorted in descending 
order within age classes, i.e. the lowest predicted age is at the top. We then estimate a trend for each 
age class along the ranked order. Finally, we predict the individuals’ age for the surveys before 1985 
by the respective estimated age-trend together with the estimated coefficients for the control varia-
bles from step one. The age-trend should function as a strong instrument. This should also avoid 
potential problems concerning our two-stage APC regression model since we use these controls in 
the first stage as well. Figure 2 shows the plots for age classes and predicted age for all affected ref-
erenda. 
Fig A1. Age prediction for referenda that only ask for age classes, 1981-1985 
Notes:  Kernel is Gaussian. Predicted age is recovered from regressions of age bins against covariates; see Section 3.3 
and Section 6. Figure A1 shows the predictions for the 17 referenda that only ask for age classes from 1981 to 
1984 (Ref id=3060, …, 3250) together with the predictions for our training data that comprise the 12 referenda 
that were held in 1985 (Ref id=3260, …, 3379), and the first referendum held in 1986 (Ref id=3380) as bench-
mark and test set, respectively. 
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3.3 VoxIt and VOTO survey data harmonization 
The VoxIt and VOTO surveys ask very similar questions. However, to merge and include the data of 
both surveys in our analysis, we harmonize the corresponding encoding of possible answers as 
shown in Table A1.  
Tab A1. Post vote survey harmonization scheme 
Variable VOXIT Recoding VOTO Recoding 
Vote decision a02x vote vote_1/_2/_3 vote 
Referendum year annee year year year 
Age age age age age=year-cohort 
Cohort cohort=year-age cohort birthyear cohort 
Gender sexe Sex sex sex 
 Female 0 0 2 0 
 Male 1 1 1 1 
 NS/Missing 9/. 9999  - 9999 
Living-Standard nivmena income income income 
 Low-Mid 3 0 5/6/7/8 0 
 Low 4 1 1/2/3/4 1 
 High-Mid 2 2 9/10/11/12 2 
 High 1 3 13/14/15 3 
 NS/Missing 9/. 9999 98/99/. 9999 
Education-lvl educ education educ education 
 Low 2 0 1/10 0 
 Min 1 1 22/31/32 1 
 Low-Mid 3 2 33 2 
 High-Mid 4 3 40 3 
 High 5 4 51 4 
 Max 6 5 52/60 5 
 NS/Missing 9/. 9999 97/98/99/. 9999 
Carownership/HH voiture car auto_besitz car 
 Car 1 0 2/3 0 
 No Car 0 1 1/4/3 1 
 NS/Missing 9/. 9999 8/9/. 9999 
Confession confess confession confess confession 
 Protestant 1 0=0 1 0 
 Roman-Catholic 2 1=2/5 2 1 
 Christ-Catholic 5 2=3/4 3/4/5 2 
 Other 3 9999= 9999 9/. 9999 
 Atheist 4 - - - 
 NS/Missing 9/. - - - 
Employment actilu employed acti employed 
 Employed 1 0 1/2/3/4/6 0 
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Variable VOXIT Recoding VOTO Recoding 
 Not Employed 2 1 5/7/8/9/10 1 
 NS/Missing 9/. 9999 98/99/. 9999 
Employment lvl actitaux lvl_employed workload lvl_employed 
 30+ h/w 1 0 10 0 
 6-29 h/w 2 1 21/22 1 
 1-5 h/w 3 2 23 2 
 NS/Missing 9/. 9999 98/99/. 9999 
Homeowner statloge homeowner habitat homeowner 
 Rent/Coop 2/3 0 1 0 
 Property 1 1 2 1 
 NS/Missing 9/. 9999 7/8/9/. 9999 
Persons/HH tmenage pers_hh hhsize Pers_hh 
 2 Persons 2 0 2 0 
 1 Person 1 1 1 1 
 3 Persons 3 2 3 2 
 4+ Persons 4/5/6 3 4 3 
 NS/Missing 9/. 9999 . 9999 
Marital Status/HH etatciv civil_status maritalstatus civil_status 
 Married 2 0 2 0 
 Single 1 1 1/7 1 
 Divorced 3 2 4 2 
 Widowed 4 3 3 3 
 Living w Partner 5 4 5/6 4 
 NS/Missing 7 7/9/.=9999 9/. 9999 
Region vilcamp city1 inhabitants city1 
 City 1 0 1/2/3 0 
 Rural 2 1 4/5/6 1 
 NS/Missing 9/. 9999 . 9999 
Canton / Location location_help location bigregion location 
 0 ZH  3 Zurich 0 Middleland 1 Lake Geneva 0 Middleland 
 1 BE 1 Middleland 1 Central 2 Middleland 1 Central 
 2 LU 5 Central 2 Lake Geneva 3 North-West 2 Lake Geneva 
 3 UR 5 Central 3 East 4 Zurich 3 East 
 4 SZ  5 Central 4 North-West 5 East 4 North-West 
 5 OW 5 Central 5 Ticino 6 Central 5 Ticino 
 6 NW 5 Central 6 Zurich  7 Ticino 6 Zurich  
 7 GL  4 East 9999 9999 9999 
 8 ZG   5 Central - - - 
 9 FR  1 Middleland - - - 
 10 SO 1 Middleland - - - 
 11 BS  2 North-West - - - 
 12 BL  2 North-West - - - 
 13 SH  4 East - - - 
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Variable VOXIT Recoding VOTO Recoding 
 14 AR 4 East - - - 
 15 AI 4 East - - - 
 16 SG 4 East - - - 
 17 GR 4 East - - - 
 18 AG 2 North-West - - - 
 19 TG 4 East - - - 
 20 TI 6 Ticino - - - 
 21 VD 0 Lake Geneva - - - 
 22 VS 0 Lake Geneva - - - 
 23 NE 1 Middleland - - - 
 24 GE 0 Lake Geneva - - - 
 25 JU 1 Middleland - - - 
 NS/Missing 9999 - - - 
Participation p01 particip part2 particip 
 10/10 10 0 10 0 
 1/10 1 1 1 1 
 2/10 2 2 2 2 
 3/10 3 3 3 3 
 4/10 4 4 4 4 
 5/10 5 5 5 5 
 6/10 6 6 6 6 
 7/10 7 7 7 7 
 8/10 8 8 8 8 
 9/10 9 9 9 9 
 NS/Missing 98/99/. 9999 98/99/. 9999 
Party-Identification party_help party party party 
 0 None 0 0 96 0 
 1 PCS/CSP 1/13/21 1 1 1 
 2 PDC/CVP 12 2 2 2 
 3 PEP/EVP 20/4 3 3 3 
 4 PRD/FDP 2 4 4 4 
 5 PdL/FPS 6/5 5 5 5 
 6 PES/GPS 19 6 6 6 
 7 AdI/LdU 7/18 7 7 7 
 8 Lega 3 8 8 8 
 9 PLS/LPS 8/9 9 9 9 
 10 PdT/PdA 
30/31/10/11/14/1
5/16/17 10 90/97/10 10 
 11 DS/SD 32 11 95 11 
 12 PSS/SPS 8888/9999 9999 98/99/. 9999 
 13 UDC/SVP - - - - 
 14 FraP - - - - 
 15 AV/GB - - - - 
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Variable VOXIT Recoding VOTO Recoding 
 16 AdG - - - - 
 17 UDF/EDU - - - - 
 18 PBD/BDP - - - - 
 19 GLP - - - - 
 20 PLR/FDP - - - - 
 21 PDC+PCS 
Group - - - - 
 22 Other Party - - - - 
 23 Other Parties - - - - 
 24 Specific Person - - - - 
 NS/Missing - - - - 
Gov trust a22 gov_trust trust_1 gov_trust 
 Trust 1 0 6/7/8/9/10 0 
 Mistrust 2 1 1/2/3/4/5 1 
 NS/Missing 8/9/. 9999 98/99/. 9999 
Ref type typex ref_type - ref_type 
 Initiative 1 0 - 0 
 Facultative Ref 2 1 - 1 
 Mandatory Ref 3 2 - 2 
 Counter Ref 4 3 - 3 
Gov recom motcfx recom - Recom 
 Yes 1 1 - 1 
 No 0 0 - 0 
NS/Missing . 9999 - 9999 
Notes: Data correspond to the Swiss VOXIT and VOTO postelection surveys. See http://forscenter.ch and 
http://www.voto.swiss for detailed information on each survey question. 
4 Aging in Switzerland 
Figure A2 shows the age distribution in the VoxIt and VOTO survey data. In this context, it is im-
portant to note that we only considered voters who effectively participated in the respective refer-
enda. Hence, the age distribution presented in Figure A2 is not representative of the overall Swiss 
population structure; instead, it represents the actual voting population. In addition to higher turn-
out rates for older voters, we further note that the minimum voter age in Switzerland was lowered 
from 20 to 18 in 1991. To maintain a consistent definition over the study period, we exclude re-
sponses from voters below the age of 20. 
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Fig A2. Age distributions in survey data 
Notes: Individual voting data on 177,851 observations from the VoxIt and VOTO postvote surveys corresponding to 305 
referenda from 1981 to 2017 in Switzerland. We restrict our data set to survey respondents who effectively casted a Yes 
or No vote in a referendum. In addition, we only consider voters who were 20 years or older. See Section 3 for further 
information. 
5 Voting results by age: Complementary evidence 
To provide complementary descriptive evidence of the existence of a generation gap in direct democ-
racy in Switzerland, we show the distribution of voters’ mean political orientations by sex and age, 
period, and birth cohort defined by decades in Table A2. The political orientation is encoded as zero 
if the vote is in line with the political right and one if it is in line with the political left. A summary of 
left-wing attitudes by theme is presented in Table 1. 
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Tab A2. Mean political orientation by age and other attributes 
Age 
20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s All 
All 17,160 30,804 33,224 33,581 32,383 22,481 7,809 391 17,160 
Status-quo vote 8,222 15,528 16,944 17,402 16,832 12,116 4,031 193 8,222 
Change vote 8,938 15,284 16,284 16,182 15,551 10,368 3,778 198 8,938 
Referendum won 7,926 13,730 15,274 15,124 14,554 10,108 3,515 188 7,926 
Referendum failed 9,234 17,082 17,954 18,460 17,829 12,376 4,294 203 9,234 
Female voter 7,754 15,937 17,234 16,578 14,668 10,163 3,589 187 7,754 
Male voter 9,406 14,867 15,990 17,003 17,715 12,318 4,220 204 9,406 
Period = 1980s 3,577 3,996 4,216 3,591 2,599 2,088 374 3,577 
Period = 1990s 6,547 10,025 11,153 8,974 7,256 5,813 1,788 33 6,547 
Period = 2000s 3,745 8,739 8,734 8,940 8,807 6,047 2,219 120 3,745 
Period = 2010s 3,291 8,052 9,125 12,079 13,721 8,536 3,428 238 3,291 
Cohort = 1890s 7 4 
Cohort = 1900s 545 815 49 
Cohort = 1910s 871 3,709 2,002 118 
Cohort = 1920s 1,393 4,687 6,450 2,706 220 
Cohort = 1930s 1,304 5,972 8,176 6,745 2,279 
Cohort = 1940s 1,259 8,137 9,585 11,568 5,035 
Cohort = 1950s 1,295 7,496 10,373 10,724 7,081 1,295 
Cohort = 1960s 6,204 10,462 9,704 5,910 6,204 
Cohort = 1970s 4,744 8,554 3,710 4,744 
Cohort = 1980s 3,356 3,041 3,356 
Cohort = 1990s 1,561 1,561 
Notes: Data covers 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. The political orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line 
with the political right and one if it is in line with the political left. A summary of left-wing attitudes by theme 
is presented in Table 1. 
6 Recovering cohort-referendum effects 
The first stage adjusts for observable voter characteristics, similar to Mincerian wage equations, and 
is our empirical attempt to remove 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑟) in our theoretical equation (1) in the main paper. 
Stage 1: 𝑉𝑖𝑐𝑟 = 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑏 + 𝜏𝑐 × 𝜎𝑟 + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑟  
𝑉𝑖𝑏𝑟 represents the 0, 1 voting decision of a voter 𝑖 associated with birth cohort 𝑐 in referendum 𝑟. In 
our analysis, we only consider survey respondents who reported actually participating and voting in 
the referendum under consideration. 𝑋 is a vector of control variables, including amongst other: ed-
ucation level, income, gender, home ownership, household structure, marital status and geographical 
variables. In general, we encode all control variables so that the baseline (0 value) refers to the voter 
with mean characteristics 𝑖 over the entire sample period, i.e. the modus is subtracted from the ob-
served outcome of the respective variable. We use categorical variables to control for observations 
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with missing and not specified values as well as “don’t know” responses. First-stage regression re-
sults are presented in Table A3. 
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Tab A3. Age effects on political orientation - first stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
 Male -0.0106*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0052 
(0.0037) 
-0.0363*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0071 
(0.0075) 
-0.0055 
(0.0051) 
-0.0023 
(0.0026) 
-0.0060 
(0.0037) 
-0.0115* 
(0.0066) 
0.0022 
(0.0075) 
0.0084* 
(0.0051) 
 NS/Missing -0.1475 
(0.1089) 
-0.4043** 
(0.1754) 
-0.0541 
(0.1927) 
0.0829 
(0.2362) 
0.4591 
(0.4526) 
-0.1076 
(0.1092) 
-0.3025* 
(0.1758) 
-0.0484 
(0.1949) 
0.0851 
(0.2374) 
0.2366 
(0.4535) 
 Low 0.0077 
(0.0074) 
0.0063 
(0.0119) 
-0.0160 
(0.0129) 
0.0563* 
(0.0303) 
0.0350** 
(0.0161) 
0.0020 
(0.0075) 
0.0157 
(0.0119) 
-0.0179 
(0.0131) 
0.0747** 
(0.0304) 
-0.0112 
(0.0162) 
 High-Mid -0.0147*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0031 
(0.0080) 
-0.0317*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0512** 
(0.0202) 
-0.0158 
(0.0114) 
-0.0086* 
(0.0052) 
0.0040 
(0.0080) 
-0.0158* 
(0.0094) 
-0.0636*** 
(0.0203) 
-0.0016 
(0.0115) 
 High -0.0370*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0077 
(0.0122) 
-0.0829*** 
(0.0137) 
-0.0891*** 
(0.0303) 
-0.0269 
(0.0168) 
-0.0217*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0013 
(0.0122) 
-0.0575*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.1108*** 
(0.0305) 
0.0201 
(0.0169) 
 NS/Missing -0.0218* 
(0.0113) 
-0.0092 
(0.0187) 
-0.0433** 
(0.0187) 
-0.0962 
(0.0716) 
-0.0141 
(0.0232) 
-0.0252** 
(0.0114) 
0.0040 
(0.0187) 
-0.0540*** 
(0.0189) 
-0.0975 
(0.0720) 
-0.0223 
(0.0233) 
 Min -0.0049 
(0.0039) 
-0.0036 
(0.0057) 
-0.0211** 
(0.0089) 
0.0041 
(0.0119) 
0.0038 
(0.0078) 
-0.0128*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0113** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0189** 
(0.0090) 
-0.0076 
(0.0119) 
-0.0117 
(0.0078) 
 Low-Mid 0.0390*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0557*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0531*** 
(0.0094) 
0.0330*** 
(0.0122) 
-0.0007 
(0.0083) 
0.0325*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0307*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0382*** 
(0.0095) 
0.0243** 
(0.0123) 
0.0363*** 
(0.0083) 
 High-Mid 0.0181*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0254*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0371*** 
(0.0114) 
0.0169 
(0.0106) 
-0.0088 
(0.0073) 
0.0192*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0246*** 
(0.0055) 
0.0287** 
(0.0115) 
0.0271** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0014 
(0.0073) 
 High 0.0191*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0345*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0091 
(0.0131) 
0.0040 
(0.0132) 
0.0001 
(0.0092) 
0.0174*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0223*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0299** 
(0.0133) 
0.0179 
(0.0132) 
0.0003 
(0.0092) 
 Max 0.0389*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0489*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0891*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0299*** 
(0.0092) 
-0.0072 
(0.0063) 
0.0291*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0196*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0466*** 
(0.0085) 
0.0418*** 
(0.0093) 
0.0270*** 
(0.0063) 
 NS/Missing -0.0111 
(0.0143) 
-0.0277 
(0.0206) 
-0.0422 
(0.0366) 
0.0458 
(0.0476) 
0.0190 
(0.0272) 
-0.0227 
(0.0144) 
-0.0299 
(0.0207) 
-0.0463 
(0.0370) 
0.0883* 
(0.0478) 
-0.0343 
(0.0273) 
 No Car 0.0447*** 
(0.0034) 
0.0380*** 
(0.0049) 
0.1238*** 
(0.0085) 
0.0623*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0041 
(0.0068) 
0.0321*** 
(0.0034) 
0.0103** 
(0.0049) 
0.0829*** 
(0.0086) 
0.0355*** 
(0.0098) 
0.0383*** 
(0.0069) 
 NS/Missing 0.0028 
(0.0122) 
-0.0320* 
(0.0183) 
0.0475 
(0.0371) 
0.0695 
(0.0424) 
0.0090 
(0.0202) 
0.0175 
(0.0123) 
0.0025 
(0.0184) 
0.0136 
(0.0376) 
0.0551 
(0.0426) 
0.0287 
(0.0202) 
 Roman-/Christ-Catholic 0.0059** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0041 
(0.0038) 
0.0085 
(0.0064) 
0.0294*** 
(0.0082) 
0.0154*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0013 
(0.0027) 
-0.0118*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0119* 
(0.0065) 
0.0155* 
(0.0083) 
0.0016 
(0.0055) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
 Other 0.0328*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0197*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0483*** 
(0.0099) 
0.0444*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0469*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0229*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0140*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0328*** 
(0.0100) 
0.0434*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0243*** 
(0.0079) 
 NS/Missing 0.0297*** 
(0.0088) 
0.0232 
(0.0148) 
0.0338** 
(0.0153) 
0.0445 
(0.0436) 
0.0319* 
(0.0173) 
0.0124 
(0.0089) 
0.0046 
(0.0148) 
0.0091 
(0.0155) 
-0.0050 
(0.0438) 
0.0333* 
(0.0174) 
 Not Employed 0.0298** 
(0.0124) 
0.0469** 
(0.0218) 
0.0354* 
(0.0196) 
-0.1187 
(0.0900) 
-0.0002 
(0.0247) 
0.0050 
(0.0124) 
-0.0091 
(0.0219) 
0.0186 
(0.0198) 
-0.0462 
(0.0905) 
0.0111 
(0.0248) 
 NS/Missing -0.0013 
(0.0186) 
0.0060 
(0.0296) 
0.0152 
(0.0363) 
-0.1741* 
(0.1004) 
-0.0214 
(0.0370) 
0.0103 
(0.0186) 
-0.0032 
(0.0297) 
0.0143 
(0.0367) 
-0.1011 
(0.1009) 
0.0361 
(0.0371) 
 6-29 h/w 0.0245*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0234*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0253*** 
(0.0089) 
0.0264*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0239*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0164*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0103** 
(0.0051) 
0.0075 
(0.0090) 
0.0300*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0276*** 
(0.0070) 
 1-5 h/w 0.0033 
(0.0096) 
0.0083 
(0.0142) 
-0.0406* 
(0.0237) 
-0.0359 
(0.0275) 
0.0396** 
(0.0186) 
0.0111 
(0.0096) 
0.0175 
(0.0143) 
0.0092 
(0.0240) 
-0.0338 
(0.0277) 
0.0214 
(0.0187) 
 NS/Missing -0.0175 
(0.0126) 
-0.0348 
(0.0220) 
-0.0283 
(0.0202) 
0.1374 
(0.0902) 
0.0097 
(0.0250) 
0.0046 
(0.0126) 
0.0125 
(0.0220) 
-0.0034 
(0.0204) 
0.0552 
(0.0906) 
0.0076 
(0.0250) 
 Property -0.0226*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0178*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0246*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.0325*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.0236*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0159*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0123*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0216*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0204*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.0173*** 
(0.0049) 
 NS/Missing -0.0124 
(0.0126) 
-0.0058 
(0.0186) 
0.0223 
(0.0287) 
-0.0246 
(0.0412) 
-0.0369 
(0.0245) 
-0.0239* 
(0.0126) 
-0.0039 
(0.0187) 
-0.0234 
(0.0291) 
-0.0104 
(0.0414) 
-0.0580** 
(0.0246) 
 1 Person -0.0089 
(0.0060) 
-0.0035 
(0.0086) 
-0.0151 
(0.0122) 
-0.0314 
(0.0194) 
-0.0141 
(0.0140) 
-0.0107* 
(0.0060) 
-0.0079 
(0.0087) 
-0.0086 
(0.0123) 
-0.0185 
(0.0195) 
-0.0190 
(0.0140) 
 3 Persons 0.0063 
(0.0059) 
0.0239*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0090 
(0.0114) 
-0.0132 
(0.0196) 
0.0010 
(0.0137) 
-0.0107* 
(0.0059) 
-0.0153* 
(0.0087) 
-0.0068 
(0.0115) 
0.0016 
(0.0197) 
-0.0056 
(0.0137) 
 4+ Persons -0.0088* 
(0.0053) 
-0.0018 
(0.0078) 
0.0132 
(0.0106) 
-0.0635*** 
(0.0176) 
-0.0248** 
(0.0124) 
-0.0100* 
(0.0053) 
-0.0146* 
(0.0078) 
0.0059 
(0.0107) 
-0.0353** 
(0.0177) 
-0.0014 
(0.0124) 
 NS/Missing 0.0640 
(0.0435) 
0.0512 
(0.0592) 
0.1321 
(0.0855) 
-0.0567 
(0.1515) 
0.1749 
(0.1314) 
0.0699 
(0.0436) 
0.1102* 
(0.0593) 
0.1017 
(0.0865) 
-0.0032 
(0.1523) 
-0.1343 
(0.1317) 
 Single 0.0106*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0121** 
(0.0055) 
0.0152 
(0.0095) 
-0.0217** 
(0.0110) 
0.0232*** 
(0.0073) 
0.0047 
(0.0038) 
0.0025 
(0.0055) 
0.0108 
(0.0096) 
-0.0228** 
(0.0111) 
0.0184** 
(0.0073) 
 Divorced 0.0011 
(0.0050) 
-0.0029 
(0.0073) 
-0.0293** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0103 
(0.0138) 
0.0308*** 
(0.0094) 
0.0036 
(0.0050) 
-0.0039 
(0.0074) 
-0.0099 
(0.0141) 
-0.0098 
(0.0139) 
0.0322*** 
(0.0095) 
 Widowed -0.0050 
(0.0053) 
-0.0092 
(0.0076) 
-0.0163 
(0.0154) 
-0.0049 
(0.0147) 
0.0114 
(0.0102) 
-0.0065 
(0.0053) 
0.0003 
(0.0076) 
-0.0197 
(0.0156) 
0.0062 
(0.0147) 
-0.0168 
(0.0102) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
 Partner 0.0055 
(0.0059) 
0.0105 
(0.0083) 
-0.0077 
(0.0182) 
-0.0134 
(0.0158) 
0.0116 
(0.0116) 
0.0006 
(0.0059) 
0.0008 
(0.0083) 
0.0094 
(0.0184) 
-0.0055 
(0.0159) 
-0.0015 
(0.0116) 
 NS/Missing -0.0282* 
(0.0155) 
-0.0290 
(0.0222) 
0.0529 
(0.0449) 
-0.0484 
(0.0462) 
-0.0443 
(0.0292) 
-0.0214 
(0.0155) 
-0.0410* 
(0.0222) 
0.0781* 
(0.0455) 
-0.0921** 
(0.0465) 
0.0018 
(0.0293) 
 Rural -0.0125*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0146*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0439*** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0075 
(0.0075) 
0.0076 
(0.0050) 
-0.0235*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0277*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0308*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0182** 
(0.0076) 
-0.0134*** 
(0.0050) 
 NS/Missing -0.0000 
(0.0456) 
-0.0355 
(0.0696) 
0.3375* 
(0.1879) 
-0.0180 
(0.0862) 
0.0113 
(0.1004) 
-0.0422 
(0.0457) 
-0.0449 
(0.0698) 
0.2225 
(0.1901) 
-0.0119 
(0.0866) 
-0.1336 
(0.1006) 
 Central 0.0234*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0104** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0011 
(0.0093) 
0.0658*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0420*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0036 
(0.0035) 
-0.0001 
(0.0051) 
0.0207** 
(0.0094) 
0.0114 
(0.0103) 
-0.0030 
(0.0070) 
 North-west -0.0072* 
(0.0038) 
-0.0201*** 
(0.0055) 
0.0209** 
(0.0096) 
-0.0312*** 
(0.0112) 
0.0114 
(0.0076) 
-0.0099*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0121** 
(0.0055) 
0.0229** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0432*** 
(0.0113) 
-0.0106 
(0.0076) 
 Ticino 0.0149** 
(0.0066) 
0.0110 
(0.0097) 
-0.0089 
(0.0158) 
0.0603*** 
(0.0192) 
0.0181 
(0.0129) 
0.0007 
(0.0066) 
0.0012 
(0.0097) 
-0.0110 
(0.0160) 
-0.0080 
(0.0193) 
0.0145 
(0.0129) 
 East -0.0064* 
(0.0038) 
-0.0093* 
(0.0055) 
0.0199** 
(0.0099) 
-0.0137 
(0.0112) 
-0.0148* 
(0.0077) 
-0.0106*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0107* 
(0.0055) 
0.0057 
(0.0101) 
-0.0329*** 
(0.0113) 
-0.0110 
(0.0077) 
 Lake Geneva -0.0000 
(0.0033) 
-0.0094* 
(0.0048) 
0.0228*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0071 
(0.0099) 
0.0092 
(0.0066) 
-0.0102*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0128 
(0.0086) 
-0.0326*** 
(0.0099) 
-0.0045 
(0.0066) 
 Zurich 0.0205*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0063 
(0.0071) 
0.0194 
(0.0127) 
0.0959*** 
(0.0136) 
0.0311*** 
(0.0095) 
0.0122** 
(0.0049) 
0.0171** 
(0.0072) 
0.0232* 
(0.0128) 
0.0253* 
(0.0136) 
-0.0102 
(0.0095) 
 NS/Missing -0.0017 
(0.0093) 
-0.0031 
(0.0135) 
-0.0289 
(0.0252) 
-0.0034 
(0.0314) 
0.0110 
(0.0168) 
0.0154* 
(0.0093) 
-0.0032 
(0.0136) 
-0.0289 
(0.0255) 
-0.0203 
(0.0316) 
0.0635*** 
(0.0169) 
 1/10 0.0073 
(0.0186) 
0.0162 
(0.0255) 
-0.0113 
(0.0481) 
-0.0271 
(0.0530) 
0.0239 
(0.0413) 
0.0000 
(0.0186) 
-0.0070 
(0.0256) 
-0.0253 
(0.0487) 
-0.0016 
(0.0533) 
0.0348 
(0.0414) 
 2/10 -0.0057 
(0.0131) 
-0.0012 
(0.0192) 
-0.0066 
(0.0291) 
0.0196 
(0.0388) 
-0.0306 
(0.0281) 
-0.0040 
(0.0131) 
-0.0021 
(0.0192) 
-0.0173 
(0.0294) 
-0.0232 
(0.0390) 
0.0106 
(0.0281) 
 3/10 -0.0013 
(0.0099) 
0.0010 
(0.0143) 
-0.0217 
(0.0238) 
0.0075 
(0.0285) 
0.0020 
(0.0207) 
0.0025 
(0.0099) 
0.0043 
(0.0143) 
0.0264 
(0.0241) 
-0.0111 
(0.0286) 
-0.0147 
(0.0208) 
 4/10 -0.0044 
(0.0097) 
-0.0194 
(0.0140) 
-0.0251 
(0.0218) 
0.0297 
(0.0273) 
0.0375* 
(0.0215) 
-0.0214** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0078 
(0.0140) 
-0.0386* 
(0.0220) 
-0.0339 
(0.0275) 
-0.0292 
(0.0215) 
 5/10 -0.0109** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0076 
(0.0068) 
-0.0283** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0156 
(0.0135) 
-0.0013 
(0.0100) 
0.0005 
(0.0048) 
0.0104 
(0.0069) 
-0.0075 
(0.0122) 
-0.0085 
(0.0136) 
-0.0132 
(0.0100) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
 6/10 -0.0046 
(0.0064) 
-0.0021 
(0.0093) 
-0.0244 
(0.0155) 
0.0051 
(0.0188) 
-0.0015 
(0.0132) 
-0.0085 
(0.0064) 
-0.0045 
(0.0093) 
-0.0171 
(0.0157) 
-0.0258 
(0.0189) 
-0.0034 
(0.0132) 
 7/10 0.0063 
(0.0048) 
0.0072 
(0.0069) 
-0.0131 
(0.0124) 
-0.0004 
(0.0139) 
0.0189* 
(0.0096) 
-0.0037 
(0.0048) 
0.0004 
(0.0069) 
-0.0135 
(0.0126) 
-0.0113 
(0.0139) 
-0.0018 
(0.0097) 
 8/10 0.0072** 
(0.0035) 
0.0135*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0124 
(0.0088) 
-0.0062 
(0.0101) 
-0.0027 
(0.0069) 
0.0081** 
(0.0035) 
0.0141*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0139 
(0.0089) 
-0.0016 
(0.0101) 
-0.0047 
(0.0069) 
 9/10 0.0116*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0104* 
(0.0055) 
0.0383*** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0038 
(0.0112) 
0.0015 
(0.0074) 
0.0097*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0078 
(0.0055) 
0.0250*** 
(0.0092) 
-0.0050 
(0.0113) 
0.0080 
(0.0074) 
 NS/Missing 0.0118 
(0.0089) 
0.0217* 
(0.0127) 
-0.0299 
(0.0254) 
0.0118 
(0.0282) 
0.0127 
(0.0163) 
0.0201** 
(0.0089) 
0.0316** 
(0.0127) 
0.0016 
(0.0257) 
-0.0020 
(0.0283) 
0.0128 
(0.0164) 
 PCS/CSP/UDC/SVP/PDC+PCS 
Group 
-0.0727*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0642*** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0822*** 
(0.0132) 
-0.1079*** 
(0.0262) 
-0.0420** 
(0.0176) 
-0.0512*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0349*** 
(0.0133) 
-0.1005*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.1133*** 
(0.0263) 
0.0412** 
(0.0176) 
 PSS/SPS 0.2441*** 
(0.0155) 
0.1982*** 
(0.0308) 
0.2307*** 
(0.0222) 
0.2915*** 
(0.0307) 
0.1245*** 
(0.0155) 
0.1179*** 
(0.0308) 
0.1845*** 
(0.0225) 
0.0059 
(0.0307) 
 PRD/FDP/PLR/FDP -0.1333*** 
(0.0161) 
-0.0163 
(0.0320) 
-0.1725*** 
(0.0232) 
-0.1783*** 
(0.0318) 
-0.0185 
(0.0162) 
0.0966*** 
(0.0321) 
-0.0979*** 
(0.0234) 
0.0128 
(0.0318) 
 PDC/CVP -0.0371* 
(0.0202) 
-0.0034 
(0.0410) 
-0.0189 
(0.0287) 
-0.1152*** 
(0.0403) 
0.0351* 
(0.0203) 
0.1895*** 
(0.0411) 
0.0030 
(0.0290) 
-0.0618 
(0.0404) 
 PdL/FPS/PES/GPS 0.3162*** 
(0.0262) 
0.2009*** 
(0.0543) 
0.3530*** 
(0.0362) 
0.3101*** 
(0.0529) 
0.1455*** 
(0.0262) 
0.0448 
(0.0544) 
0.2526*** 
(0.0367) 
-0.0043 
(0.0530) 
 GLP 0.1087*** 
(0.0333) 
0.0827 
(0.0704) 
0.1884*** 
(0.0449) 
-0.0896 
(0.0706) 
0.1472*** 
(0.0334) 
0.1446** 
(0.0705) 
0.2082*** 
(0.0454) 
-0.0074 
(0.0707) 
 AdI/LdU/PBD/BDP 0.0132 
(0.0515) 
0.1753* 
(0.0995) 
-0.0520 
(0.0747) 
-0.0081 
(0.1010) 
0.0073 
(0.0516) 
0.0347 
(0.0998) 
0.0322 
(0.0755) 
-0.0476 
(0.1012) 
 PEP/EVP 0.1352** 
(0.0590) 
0.0991 
(0.1114) 
0.2382*** 
(0.0891) 
0.0081 
(0.1104) 
0.0907 
(0.0591) 
0.1735 
(0.1116) 
0.1646* 
(0.0901) 
-0.0788 
(0.1106) 
 Lega/PLS/LPS -0.0527 
(0.0440) 
-0.0475 
(0.0909) 
-0.0702 
(0.0646) 
-0.0405 
(0.0801) 
0.0842* 
(0.0441) 
-0.0959 
(0.0912) 
-0.0223 
(0.0653) 
0.3887*** 
(0.0802) 
 Other Party 0.0982*** 
(0.0216) 
0.0415 
(0.0418) 
0.1132*** 
(0.0316) 
0.1015** 
(0.0419) 
0.0564*** 
(0.0216) 
0.0958** 
(0.0419) 
0.0725** 
(0.0319) 
-0.0219 
(0.0420) 
 Specific Person 0.0131 
(0.0323) 
0.0784 
(0.0658) 
-0.0145 
(0.0453) 
0.0134 
(0.0640) 
0.0354 
(0.0323) 
0.1635** 
(0.0659) 
0.0347 
(0.0458) 
-0.0821 
(0.0642) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Political 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
Reform 
orientation 
NS/Missing 0.0040 
(0.0046) 
0.0055 
(0.0067) 
0.0025 
(0.0128) 
-0.0258** 
(0.0130) 
0.0147* 
(0.0084) 
-0.0140*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.0042 
(0.0067) 
0.0195 
(0.0130) 
-0.0189 
(0.0131) 
-0.0381*** 
(0.0085) 
 Misstrust 0.0021 
(0.0025) 
-0.0386*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0195*** 
(0.0063) 
0.0447*** 
(0.0072) 
0.0677*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0349*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0294*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0229*** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0024 
(0.0073) 
-0.0699*** 
(0.0049) 
 NS/Missing 0.0242*** 
(0.0033) 
0.0096** 
(0.0047) 
0.0076 
(0.0086) 
0.0638*** 
(0.0095) 
0.0404*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0006 
(0.0033) 
0.0007 
(0.0047) 
-0.0048 
(0.0087) 
0.0281*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0116* 
(0.0065) 
Constant 0.4351*** 
(0.0303) 
0.4780*** 
(0.0423) 
0.4158*** 
(0.0429) 
0.4910*** 
(0.1265) 
0.2966*** 
(0.1021) 
0.4683*** 
(0.0304) 
0.4580*** 
(0.0424) 
0.4440*** 
(0.0434) 
0.5132*** 
(0.1272) 
0.5894*** 
(0.1023) 
Attitude groups All Ideological Environ. Gener. Fiscal All Ideological Environ. Gener. Fiscal 
Ref. x cohort effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 177851 83574 28673 21231 44373 177851 83574 28673 21231 44373 
r2 .209 .215 .202 .179 .231 .206 .211 .183 .171 .226 
Notes: Unit of observation is individual voting decision. Cohort effects are defined for five-year bin of birth cohort (e.g. 1900-1904). Reform [political] orientation is 0 if pro status 
quo [right-wing] and 1 if pro change [left-wing]. Missing values in variables are set to zero and indicated by variable-specific 0,1 dummies (labeled NS/Missing). Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered on cohort-referendum effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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7 Imputation of missing cohort-referendum effects 
As a matter of course, the VoxIt surveys do not cover all relevant chronological ages and birth cohorts 
across all 305 referenda. Although their number is negligible, we perform a data imputation and re-
rank-ranking approach. It is reasonable that cohort effects do not differ excessively from adjacent 
birth cohorts. We therefore impute missing cohort fixed effects by linear interpolation of adjacent 
cohorts’ estimated coefficients. We only impute missing cohort fixed effects if these missing cohort 
effects are adjacent to observed cohorts (ages), i.e. we do not extrapolate.  
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8 Unconstrained rank model 
Throughout this section, we show the remaining results of variations of our unconstrained rank 
model approach that we discuss in Section 5 of the main text.  
8.1 Semi-non-parametric effects by reform orientation and political ori-
entation: Varying bandwidths  
Fig A3. Semi-non-parametric aging effect on reform and political orientation rank: 𝝁 = 𝟐 
Notes: The figure is based on individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Upper panels 
show the predicted rank from locally weighted polynomial (degree = 1) regressions (LWR) of reform/political 
orientation rank against voter age controlling cohort effects. Before running the LWR, cohort fixed effects are  
removed in auxiliary linear regression. LWRs are weighted by distance from an age bin (the black dots) using 
a Gaussian kernel and twice the Silverman rule-of-thumb bandwidth. Bottom panels show the marginal effect 
of age on the orientation rank. Individual data are aggregated to the age group – period level. Reform [political] 
orientation rank is the rank in the distribution of mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-
year age (20-24, 25-29, ..., 85-89) x five-year period (1980-1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2015-2017) cells. Reform [po-
litical] orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in status-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [polit-
ical] orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with the status quo [the political right] and one if the 
vote is in line with a vote for change [the political left]. The reform [political] orientation is adjusted in a first-
stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against a battery of first-stage controls and referendum-
age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to generate the rank measures used here. 95% confidence 
intervals (bars)  based on standard errors clustered on cohort fixed effects. 
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Fig A4. Semi-non-parametric aging effect on reform and political orientation rank: 𝝁 = 𝟑 
Notes: The figure is based on individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Upper panels 
show the predicted rank from locally weighted polynomial (degree = 1) regressions (LWR) of reform/political 
orientation rank against voter age controlling cohort effects. Before running the LWR, cohort fixed effects are  
removed in auxiliary linear regression. LWRs are weighted by distance from an age bin (the black dots) using 
a Gaussian kernel and three times the Silverman rule-of-thumb bandwidth. Bottom panels show the marginal 
effect of age on the orientation rank. Individual data are aggregated to the age group – period level. Reform 
[political] orientation rank is the rank in the distribution of mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation 
within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ..., 85-89) x five-year period (1980-1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2015-2017) cells. 
Reform [political] orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in status-quo [right-wing] orientation. The 
reform [political] orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with the status quo [the political right] and 
one if the vote is in line with a vote for change [the political left]. The reform [political] orientation is adjusted 
in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against a battery of first-stage controls and ref-
erendum-age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to generate the rank measures used here. 95% con-
fidence intervals (bars) based on standard errors clustered on cohort fixed effects. 
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8.2 LWR estimates of marginal aging effects by attitude groups 
Fig A5. Semi-non-parametric aging effects by attitude group (Silverman-rule bandwidth) 
 
Notes: The figure is based on individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. All panels show 
marginal aging effects from locally weighted polynomial (degree = 1) regressions (LWR) of reform/political 
orientation rank against voter age controlling cohort effects. LWRs are weighted by distance from an age bin 
(the black dots) using a Gaussian kernel and a Silverman rule-of-thumb bandwidth. Individual data are aggre-
gated to the age-group-period level. Prior to the LWR, cohort effects are removed after running an auxiliary 
regression of the orientation rank against cohort fixed effects. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank 
in the distribution of mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x 
five-year period (1980-1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2010-2014) cells. Reform [political] orientation ranks are field 
ranks that increase in status-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] orientation is encoded as zero 
if the vote is in line with the status quo [the political right] and one if the vote is in line with a vote for change 
[the political left]. The reform [political] orientation is adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [polit-
ical] orientation against a battery of first-stage controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects in which the lat-
ter are used to generate the rank measures used here. 95% confidence intervals (bars) based on standard 
errors clustered on cohort fixed effects. 
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8.3 Parametric aging effects by attitude group and age group 
Tab A4. Parametric aging effects on reform and political orientation rank by attitude 
group 
Attitude Group Ideological Environmentalist Generational Fiscal 
# of referenda 145 48 33 79 
Reform orientation rank  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age (years) 0.115 
(0.131) 
0.285* 
(0.138) 
0.281 
(0.171) 
-0.456* 
(0.228) 
r2 0.452 0.264 0.391 0.371 
Political orientation rank (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age (years) 0.601** 
(0.242) 
0.398* 
(0.219) 
0.265* 
(0.146) 
0.033 
(0.151) 
r2 0.475 0.333 0.509 0.366 
Cohort effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ages All All All All 
N 112 112 112 112 
Notes:  The output is inferred from individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Data are 
aggregated to the age-group-period level. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank in the distribution of 
mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x five-year period (1980-
1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2010-2014) cells. Reform [political] orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in sta-
tus-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with 
the status quo [the political right] and one if the vote is in line with a vote for change [the political left]. The 
reform [political] orientation was adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation 
against a battery of first-stage controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to 
generate the rank measures used here. Standard errors clustered on cohort fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
Tab A5. Age effects on reform orientation rank by attitude group and age group 
Attitude group Ideological Environmentalist Generational Fiscal 
# of referenda 145 48 33 79 
Reform orientation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age (years) 0.331 
(0.295) 
0.000 
(0.269) 
0.429 
(0.335) 
0.202 
(0.278) 
0.177 
(0.454) 
0.494 
(0.398) 
0.206 
(0.388) 
-0.661 
(0.390) 
r2 0.397 0.477 0.307 0.206 0.275 0.367 0.109 0.492 
Political orientation (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Age (years) 0.251 
(0.494) 
1.146*** 
(0.307) 
0.257 
(0.400) 
0.717** 
(0.314) 
0.411 
(0.278) 
0.440 
(0.344) 
-0.669 
(0.447) 
0.095 
(0.177) 
r2 0.175 0.546 0.202 0.387 0.391 0.492 0.534 0.282 
Cohort effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohorts All All All All All All All All 
Ages < 50 >= 50 < 50 >= 50 < 50 >= 50 < 50 >= 50 
N 48 64 48 64 48 64 48 64 
Notes:  The output is inferred from individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Data are 
aggregated to the age group – period level. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank in the distribution of 
mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x five-year period (1980-
1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2010-2014) cells. Reform [political] orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in sta-
tus-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with 
the status quo [the political right] and one if the vote is in line with a vote for change [the political left]. The 
reform [political] orientation is adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against 
a battery of first-stage controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to generate 
the rank measures used here. Standard errors clustered on cohort fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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9  Robustness and extension 
9.1  Age effect on political orientation conditional on reform orientation 
In the table below, we present estimates of the aging effect on the political orientation rank, control-
ling for the reform orientation rank. Models (1) and (3) replicate models (9) and (10) from Table 4 
in the main paper. In models (2) and (4), we add the political orientation rank. In keeping with the 
cross-sectional results presented in Figure 3 in the main paper, the additional control has a small 
effect on the aging effect, especially if cohort effects are controlled for (model 4 vs. 3). A status-quo 
orientation that increases in age, thus, is an insufficient explanation for the change in political orien-
tation from left-wing to right-wing over the course of voters’ life cycle.  
In model (5) we, replicate model (4) from Table 4, in which we estimate the aging effect on the reform 
orientation rank conditional on cohort effects. Further controlling for the political orientation rank 
in model (6) reduces the already small and insignificant aging effect by approximately 50%. These 
results further substantiate the impression that compared with the habitualization hypothesis, the 
utility-maximization hypothesis has more support in the data with regard to explaining the genera-
tion gap in direct democracy. 
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Tab A6. Age effects on political orientation rank conditional on reform orientation rank 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Political 
orientation 
rank  
Political 
orientation 
rank  
Political 
orientation 
rank  
Political 
orientation 
rank  
Reform 
orientation 
rank 
Reform 
orientation 
rank 
Age (years) 0.738*** 
(0.071) 
0.664*** 
(0.080) 
0.617*** 
(0.201) 
0.605*** 
(0.201) 
0.187 
(0.197) 
0.094 
(0.263) 
Reform orientation 
rank  
 
 
0.256*** 
(0.078) 
 
 
0.063 
(0.079) 
 
 
 
 
Political orientation 
rank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.151 
(0.194) 
Attitude group All All All All All All 
Cohort effects - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ages All All All All All All 
N 112 112 112 112 112 112 
r2 0.545 0.605 0.737 0.740 0.371 0.377 
Notes:  The output is inferred from individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Individual 
data are aggregated to the age-group-period level. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank in the distri-
bution of mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x five-year pe-
riod (1980-1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2010-2014) cells. Prior to the LWR, cohort effects are removed after running 
an auxiliary regression of the orientation rank against cohort fixed effects where indicated. Reform [political] 
orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in status-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] 
orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with the status quo [the political right] and one if the vote is 
in line with a vote for change [the political left]. Addition of controls means that the reform [political] orienta-
tion is adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against a battery of first-stage 
controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to generate the rank measures used 
here. Standard errors clustered on cohort fixed effects where included. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
9.2 Serial correlation in political orientation ranks 
If cohort effects are a strong determinant of voter orientation, the lagged rank of a cohort will be a 
strong predictor of the contemporary rank since the cohort effect is time-invariant. In Table A7, we 
test this hypothesis by regressing the orientation rank against its own lag (one period is equivalent 
to five years). We find no significant serial correlation in the reform orientation ranks, regardless of 
whether we control for age or period effects.  
By contrast, we find strong and positive serial correlation in political orientation ranks. However, 
lagged effect becomes insignificant once we control for age. This suggests that the serial correlation 
in political orientation is largely attributable to serial correlation in age. The aging effect is within 
close range of the benchmark estimate in Table 4, column (4) in the main paper.  
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Tab A7. Serial correlation in political orientation ranks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Reform 
orientation 
rank 
Reform 
orientation 
rank 
Reform 
orientation 
rank 
Political 
orientation 
rank 
Political 
orientation 
rank 
Political 
orientation 
rank 
Lagged (by one period) 
orientation rank 
0.029 
(0.130) 
-0.105 
(0.116) 
-0.051 
(0.129) 
0.628*** 
(0.128) 
0.097 
(0.156) 
0.221 
(0.176) 
Age (years)  
 
0.198 
(0.165) 
0.249 
(0.170) 
 
 
0.587*** 
(0.146) 
0.547*** 
(0.161) 
Period effects Yes - Yes Yes - Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 91 91 91 91 91 91 
r2 .0174 .0468 .0782 .524 .582 .604 
Notes:  The output is inferred from individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Individual 
data are aggregated to the age-group-period level. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank in the distri-
bution of mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x five-year pe-
riod (1980-1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2010-2014) cells. Prior to the LWR, cohort effects are removed after running 
an auxiliary regression of the orientation rank against cohort fixed effects where indicated. Reform [political] 
orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in status-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] 
orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with the status quo [the political right] and one if the vote is 
in line with a vote for change [the political right]. The addition of controls means that the reform [political] 
orientation is adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against a battery of first-
stage controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to generate the rank measures 
used here. Standard errors clustered on cohort fixed effects where included. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
9.3 Correlation between age and cohort effects 
Table 4 in the main paper reveals that controlling for cohort effects reduces the age effect on the 
reform orientation rank and to a relatively more limited extent, the age effect on the political orien-
tation rank. This indicates a positive correlation between cohort effects and age. The time-invariant 
component in reform and political orientation should be larger (leaning toward the status quo and 
the political right) for those who are old when we observe them in our data. This correlation, which 
leads to biased estimates of aging effects in the cross-section, is illustrated in the figure below. As 
expected, the correlation is positive, illustrating the importance of controlling for cohort effects when 
estimating aging effects on political outcomes, especially if the longitudinal dimension of a data set is 
limited (covering less than a voting life).  
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Fig A6. Mean orientation rank by age group 
 
Notes:  The output is inferred from individual data from exit polls from 305 referenda from 1981 to 2017. Data are 
aggregated to the age-group-period level. Reform [political] orientation rank is the rank in the distribution of 
mean (adjusted) reform [political] orientation within five-year age (20-24, 25-29, ...) x five-year period (1980-
1984, 1985-1989, ..., 2010-2014) cells. Reform [political] orientation ranks are field ranks that increase in sta-
tus-quo [right-wing] orientation. The reform [political] orientation is encoded as zero if the vote is in line with 
the status quo [the political right] and one if the vote is in line with a vote for change [the political left]. The 
reform [political] orientation is adjusted in a first-stage regression of the reform [political] orientation against 
a battery of first-stage controls and referendum-age-bin fixed effects in which the latter are used to generate 
the rank measures used here. Unconditional cohort effects are the mean orientation ranks by cohort. Cohort 
effects are recovered from regressions of orientation ranks against age and cohort effects. Mean cohort effects 
are the means within age groups, and the vertical error bars are the associated standard deviations.  
9.4  Age effects on reform and political orientation 
The focus of our econometric analysis has been to distinguish between aging effects and cohort ef-
fects on orientation ranks because the APC effects on orientation levels cannot be separately identi-
fied without further constraints.  
In the table below, we complement the analysis by exploring the relationship between voter orienta-
tions and APC effects in levels. Unlike in the rank analysis, the unit of observation is an individual 
voting decision. We begin with cross-sectional models that exclude and include individual controls 
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in the first two columns and add referendum effects in the third column. The age effect decreases as 
the controls are being added. The models in the third column (3 and 9) are the parametric equivalents 
to Figure 3 in the main paper. Consistent with that figure, the probability of voting for a change in the 
legal status quo over a 60-year voting life declines by 0.0006 x 60 = 0.036 percentage points. Like-
wise, the probability of supporting left-wing policies declines by 0.001 x 60 = 0.06.  
By controlling for referendum effects, we assume that differences in the mean vote across referenda 
are attributable to different NPVs of the proposed referenda and not to average increases in age. Al-
ternatively, we can assume that the NPV of the proposed reforms does not follow a time trend and 
that there are no period effects. In this case, we can omit referendum effects, and, instead, control for 
arbitrary cohort effects, as in the fourth column. The aging effect increases significantly by a factor of 
4 (political orientation) to 7 (reform orientation).  
In the fifth column, we combine the control for referendum effects with a control for social generation 
effects (as defined in Figure 8 in the main paper), so that the aging effect is identified by aging within 
generations. This is our preferred model because it identifies the aging effect conditional on arbitrary 
period (referendum) effects and a large fraction of the time-invariant variation across birth cohorts. 
A regression of the cohort effects in the reform orientation ranks and the political orientation ranks 
displayed in Figure 8 in the main paper against generation fixed effects yields an r2 of 53% (reform 
orientation) and nearly 70% (political orientation). Accordingly, aging by one year reduces the prob-
ability of voting for change by 0.08 percentage points and the probability of voting for a left policy by 
0.13 percentage points.  
To compare these aging effects on orientation levels to the effects implied by our rank models, we 
estimate the relationship between orientation ranks and levels in the last column. The marginal effect 
on the orientation level implied by a rank model is simply the product of the age effect on the rank 
(form Table 4, fourth column 4 in the main paper) and the rank effect on the level (last column in the 
table below). The result is that per year of aging, the probability of voting for change decreases by 
0.03 while the probability of voting for a left-wing policy decreases by 0.13 percentage points. 
Reassuringly, aging effects on levels from both approaches are within the same range although the 
implied level effects from the rank models are somewhat smaller, possibly due to the stronger control 
for correlated cohort effects. One insight from all models reported below is that our benchmark aging 
effects are conservative in the sense that we potentially overcontrol for the effect of aging on the 
average vote (as reflected by the large estimates reported in the fourth column). 
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Tab A8. Age effects on reform orientation 
Reform orientation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age -0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0046*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0003) 
 
 
Reform orientation rank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0003) 
Marginal age effect on orientation - - - - - -.0003 
r2 .000699 .0124 .176 .0154 .176 .158 
Political orientation (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Age -0.0015*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0036*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0002) 
 
 
Political orientation rank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0003) 
Marginal age effect on orientation - - - - - -.0011 
r2 .00257 .0154 .181 .0172 .181 .344 
Controls - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Referendum effects - - Yes - Yes - 
Cohort effects - - - Yes - Yes 
Generation effects - - - - Yes - 
Ages All All All All All All 
N 177,851 177,851 177,851 177,851 177,851 112 
Notes:  Unit of observation is individual voting decision throughout columns (1-4) and age bin-period in column (5). 
Cohort effects are defined for integer birth years. Generation effects are defined for traditionalists (birth years 
up to 1945), baby boomers (1946-1964), generation X (1965-76), and generation Y (from 1977 on). The mar-
ginal effect of aging on outcome in models (6) and (12) is the rank effect on orientation multiplied by the aging 
effect on rank from Table 4, model (4) and model (10). Reform (political) orientation rank is the rank in the 
distribution of mean (adjusted) reform (political) orientation within five-year age group (20-24, 25-29, ...) x 
five-year period (1980-1984, 1985-1989, ...) cells. Reform [political] orientation is 0 if pro status quo [right-
wing] and 1 if pro change [left-wing]. Ranks increase from the largest pro change [left-wing] to the smallest 
pro status quo [right-wing] reform [political] orientation value. In models (6) and (12), orientations are ad-
justed in first-stage regressions of orientation against a battery of individual controls and cohort-referendum 
effects. Standard errors are generally clustered on referendum fixed effects where included and on cohort ef-
fects in models (4) and (10). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix II 
Version: May 2018 
1 Introduction 
This appendix complements the main paper by providing a concise list of the Swiss referenda con-
sidered in this study in Table 1. Between June 14, 1981 and May 21, 2017, 312 public referenda took 
place at the federal level in Switzerland. We include all 305 referenda in our analysis for which there 
exist survey data. These referenda fall into 12 officially defined contextual categories (Ebene-1 
Deskriptoren). Within each category, we define subcategories of contextually homogenous referenda, 
which we refer to as themes. In total, we define 24 themes, which we then aggregate to four attitude 
groups. The ideological attitude group comprises referenda on questions that concern the constitu-
tional order, foreign affairs and security policy and relate to voters’ beliefs and values in such a man-
ner that a voter decision can be described as either conservative or liberal. The environmentalist 
attitude group comprises referenda in which voters’ decisions have direct consequences for the pro-
tection of the environment, e.g. by affecting carbon emissions or protecting natural habitats. In the 
generational attitude group, we include referenda on policies that are specifically targeted at certain 
age groups, e.g. allowances for families (with dependent children) or labor market regulations (e.g. 
regarding maximum working hours) that affect those who are not yet retired. Finally, the fiscal atti-
tude group includes referenda in which voters have the choice between options that have distribu-
tional consequences that can be described as either progressive (e.g. relatively more important in-
come tax) or regressive (e.g. relatively more important tolls and user fees). In the interest of a trans-
parent empirical analysis, we define attitude groups to render them mutually exclusive. 
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Tab. 1. Referenda included in the analysis 
# 
VOXIT/ 
VOTO id Year Subject Theme Vote 
Reform 
orientation 
Political 
orientation Attitude group 
1 151 1981 Equal rights for men and women 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
2 152 1981 Consumer protection 04B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
3 161 1981 Continuation of the financial order 06A Yes Pro status quo Right-wing Fiscal 
4 181 1982 Consumer protection 04B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
5 182 1982 Consumer protection 04B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
6 191 1983 Regulation of fuel tax 08B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
7 192 1983 Federal energy act 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
8 211 1984 Imposition of a heavy vehicle charge 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
9 212 1984 Charges for use of national roads 08B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
10 213 1984 Introduction of a civilian service 03A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
11 221 1984 Against the misuse of banking secrecy 06A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
12 222 1984 Against the sell-off of the home land 09B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
13 232 1984 Moratorium on nuclear power plants 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
14 231 1984 Energy supply 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
15 241 1984 Protection of motherhood 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
16 242 1984 Radio and television article 12A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
17 243 1984 Compensation to victims of violent crime 01A* Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
18 252 1985 Repeal contributions for primary schools 11A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
19 253 1985 Abolition of federal contributions to health care 06B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
20 254 1985 Federal education contributions 11A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
21 251 1985 Extension of paid holidays 04A Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
22 261 1985 Abortions and the right to live 10A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
23 262 1985 Canton's share of the net yield of stamp taxes 06B Yes Pro status quo Right-wing Fiscal 
24 263 1985 Redistribution of net income from spirits 06B Yes Pro status quo Right-wing Fiscal 
25 264 1985 Subsidies for self-sufficiency in grain 05A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
26 271 1985 Coordination of school year period 11A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
27 272 1985 Innovation risk guarantee for companies 04A Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
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# 
VOXIT/ 
VOTO id Year Subject Theme Vote 
Reform 
orientation 
Political 
orientation Attitude group 
28 273 1985 Changes to the Swiss Civil Code 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
29 281 1985 Abolition of vivisection 11B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
30 291 1986 Accession to the United Nations 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
31 301 1986 ‘Culture initiative’ 12A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
32 302 1986 Alternative draft ‘Culture initiative’ 12A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
33 303 1986 Support of education and retraining  11A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
34 304 1986 Domestic sugar industry 05A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
35 321 1987 Asylum Act 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
36 322 1987 Residence and establishment of foreigners 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
37 323 1987 People's rights in military expenses 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
38 324 1987 Counter-proposals and public votes 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
39 341 1987 ‘Concept Train 2000’  08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
40 342 1987 Health insurance 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
41 343 1987 Protect the moors - Rothenthurm initiative 09A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
42 351 1988 Coordinated transport policy 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
43 352 1988 Decrease in retirement age 10D Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
44 361 1988 Against land speculation 09B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
45 362 1988 Shorter working hours 04A Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
46 363 1988 Limiting immigration 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
47 371 1989 Factory farming and ecological agriculture 09A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
48 382 1989 Defense policy  03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
49 381 1989 Reducing speed limit 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
50 391 1990 Limiting road construction 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
51 392 1990 Limiting road construction 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
52 393 1990 Limiting road construction 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
53 394 1990 Limiting road construction 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
54 395 1990 Viticulture 05A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
55 396 1990 Federal Legal Administration 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
56 401 1990 Exit nuclear energy 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
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# 
VOXIT/ 
VOTO id Year Subject Theme Vote 
Reform 
orientation 
Political 
orientation Attitude group 
57 402 1990 Moratorium on nuclear power plants 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
58 403 1990 Energy Article 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
59 404 1990 Road traffic 08A Yes Pro change Right-wing Environmentalist 
60 411 1991 Reducing voting age 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
61 412 1991 Support public transport 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
62 421 1991 Reorganization of federal finances 06A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
63 422 1991 Military Penal Code 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
64 431 1992 Support affordable health insurance 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
65 432 1992 Against animal experiments 11B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
66 441 1992 Access to Bretton Woods 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
67 442 1992 Water Protection Act 09A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
68 443 1992 Water protection 09A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
69 444 1992 Reproductive and genetic engineering 11B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
70 445 1992 Introduction of a civilian service 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
71 446 1992 Swiss Penal Code and Military Penal Code 01A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
72 461 1992 Swiss railway (‘Alpentransit’) 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
73 462 1992 Commercial Traffic Act 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
74 463 1992 Compensation Act 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
75 464 1992 Infrastructure Act 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
76 465 1992 Swiss federal stamp tax 06A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
77 466 1992 Farming land rights 05A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
78 471 1992 European Economic Area 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
79 481 1993 Increase in fuel tax 08B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
80 482 1993 Abolition of the ban on casinos 10C* Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
81 483 1993 Against animal experiments 11B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
82 491 1993 Environmental protection in the military 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
83 492 1993 Military expenses on aircraft 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
84 501 1993 Law on fire arms 01A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
85 502 1993 Reallocation of administrative districts 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
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# 
VOXIT/ 
VOTO id Year Subject Theme Vote 
Reform 
orientation 
Political 
orientation Attitude group 
86 503 1993 Introduction of a new public holiday 04A Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
87 504 1993 Health Insurance 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
88 505 1993 Unemployment insurance  10E Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
89 511 1993 Financial order 06A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
90 512 1993 Recovery of federal finances 06A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
91 513 1993 Support social insurance 10C Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
92 514 1993 Special excise taxes 06A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
93 515 1993 Reducing alcohol problems 10A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
94 516 1993 Reducing tobacco problems 10A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
95 521 1994 Continuation of the national road tax 08B Yes Pro status quo Right-wing Fiscal 
96 522 1994 Continuation of the heavy vehicle charge 08A Yes Pro status quo Left-wing Environmentalist 
97 523 1994 Special heavy vehicle charge 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
98 524 1994 Protection of Alpine area 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
99 525 1994 Aviation Act 08A Yes Pro change Right-wing Environmentalist 
100 532 1994 Cultural promotion article 12A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
101 533 1994 Revision of civil rights regulation 10G Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
102 531 1994 Peacekeeping Operations (BTFO) 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
103 541 1994 Abolition of domestic grain subsidies 05A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
104 542 1994 Antiracism and criminal code 10G Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
105 551 1994 Revision of health insurance 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
106 552 1994 For sound health insurance 10B Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
107 553 1994 Compulsory measures in the Aliens Act 10G Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
108 561 1995 For environmentally sound agriculture  09A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
109 562 1995 Dairy Decision 1988 (MWB) 05A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
110 563 1995 Agriculture Act 05A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
111 564 1995 Federal expenditure caps 06B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
112 571 1995 Age insurance 10C Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
113 572 1995 Support age and disability insurance 10C Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
114 573 1995 Acquisition of land by persons abroad 09B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
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# 
VOXIT/ 
VOTO id Year Subject Theme Vote 
Reform 
orientation 
Political 
orientation Attitude group 
115 581 1996 Revision language article 12A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
116 582 1996 Reallocation of administrative districts 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
117 583 1996 Cantonal military expenses 06B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
118 584 1996 Issues in federal expenses and subsidies 05A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
119 585 1996 Issues in federal expenses and subsidies 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
120 591 1996 Environmentally sound agriculture 05A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
121 592 1996 Administration Organization Act (RVGO) 06A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
122 601 1996 Against illegal immigration 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
123 602 1996 Working conditions in industry  04A Yes Pro change Right-wing Generational 
124 611 1997 People's rights in EU accession negotiations 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
125 612 1997 Prohibition of military exports 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
126 613 1997 Gun powder production and distribution 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
127 622 1997 Financing unemployment insurance 10E Yes Pro change Right-wing Generational 
128 621 1997 ‘Youth Without Drugs’ 10A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
129 632 1998 Federal expenses and budget balancing 06B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
130 631 1998 Reproductive and genetic engineering 11B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
131 633 1998 State surveillance and political persecution 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
132 641 1998 Special heavy vehicle charge 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
133 642 1998 Food prices and ecological farming 05A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
134 643 1998 Revision age insurance  10D Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
135 651 1998 Support public transport 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
136 652 1998 Temporary new grain article 05A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
137 653 1998 Reasonable drug policy 10A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
138 654 1998 Working conditions in industry 04A Yes Pro change Right-wing Generational 
139 661 1999 Requirements for eligibility in the Bundesrat 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
140 664 1999 Transplantation medicine 10A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
141 662 1999 Residential property 09B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
142 663 1999 Spatial planning 09B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
143 671 1999 New federal constitution 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
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144 681 1999 Asylum Act 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
145 682 1999 Asylum policy and Aliens Act 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
146 683 1999 Medical prescription of heroin 10A Yes Pro status quo Left-wing Ideological 
147 684 1999 Disability insurance 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
148 685 1999 Mother insurance 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
149 691 2000 Judicial reform 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
150 692 2000 Acceleration of direct democracy 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
151 693 2000 Contingent of women in federal authorities 01A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
152 694 2000 Reproductive technology 10A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
153 695 2000 Limiting road traffic  09A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
154 701 2000 Sectoral agreements with the EU 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
155 712 2000 Support solar energy 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
156 712 2000 Support renewable energy 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
157 713 2000 Pigouvian tax on energy 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
158 714 2000 Regulation of immigration 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
159 715 2000 Referendums and counter-proposals 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
160 721 2000 Against increasing retirement age 10D Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
161 722 2000 Flexible age insurance with 62 10D Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
162 723 2000 Military expenses and defense policy 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
163 724 2000 Lower hospital costs 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
164 725 2000 Federal personnel law 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
165 731 2001 Accession to the EU 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
166 732 2001 Lower medicine prices 10B Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
167 733 2001 Reducing speed limit 10F* Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
168 741 2001 Military Administration (armament) 03A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
169 742 2001 Military Administration (education) 03A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
170 743 2001 Construction of dioceses 12A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
171 751 2001 Federal expenses and debt caps 06B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
172 752 2001 Secure age insurance by taxing energy 10C Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
Ahlfeldt, Maennig, Mueller – The generation gap in direct democracy 8 
# 
VOXIT/ 
VOTO id Year Subject Theme Vote 
Reform 
orientation 
Political 
orientation Attitude group 
173 753 2001 Defense policy 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
174 754 2001 Alternative civilian service 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
175 755 2001 Capital gains tax 06A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
176 761 2002 Accession to the UN 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
177 762 2002 Shorter working hours 04A Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
178 771 2002 Abortion law 10A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
179 772 2002 Protection of motherhood 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
180 782 2002 Excessive gold reserves for age insurance 10C Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
181 783 2002 Electricity Market Act 04B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
182 791 2002 Against asylum abuse 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
183 792 2002 Unemployment insurance  10E Yes Pro status quo Left-wing Generational 
184 801 2003 Changes to the people's rights 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
185 802 2003 Cantonal contribution to hospital costs 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
186 811 2003 Military administration 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
187 812 2003 Civil protection 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
188 821 2003 Social tenancy law 09B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
189 813 2003 Limiting road traffic  08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
190 814 2003 Support health insurance 10B Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
191 815 2003 Equality of treatment for the disabled 10B Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
192 822 2003 Exit nuclear energy 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
193 823 2003 Moratorium on nuclear power plants 07A Yes Pro status quo Left-wing Environmentalist 
194 824 2003 For sufficient vocational training 11A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
195 831 2004 Safe and efficient motorways 08A Yes Pro change Right-wing Environmentalist 
196 832 2004 Code of Obligations (tenancy) 04B* Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
197 833 2004 Confinement of nontreatable pedophiles 01A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
198 841 2004 Revision age insurance  10C Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
199 842 2004 Increasing VAT for age insurance 10C Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
200 843 2004 Issues in private taxation 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
201 851 2004 Naturalization of young foreigners 10G Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
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202 852 2004 Citizenship of third generation foreigners 10G Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
203 853 2004 Postal service  04B* Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
204 854 2004 Income Substitution Act (EOG) 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
205 861 2004 Federal and cantonal revenue equalization 06B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
206 862 2004 New federal order 06B Yes Pro status quo Right-wing Fiscal 
207 863 2004 Research on embryonic stem cells 11B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
208 871 2005 Schengen and Dublin agreements 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
209 872 2005 Partnership Act 01A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
210 881 2005 Free movement of persons 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
211 891 2005 Genetic engineering and agriculture 05A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
212 892 2005 Working time regulations 04A Yes Pro change Right-wing Generational 
213 901 2006 Constitutional provisions on education 11A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
214 911 2006 Central bank profits for age insurance  10C Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
215 912 2006 Aliens Act 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
216 913 2006 Changes to the law on foreign nationals 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
217 921 2006 Cooperation with Eastern Europe states 02A Yes Pro status quo Left-wing Ideological 
218 922 2006 Support family income  10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
219 931 2007 Social health insurance fund 10B Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
220 941 2007 Revision Disability insurance 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
221 951 2008 Against jet fighter noise in tourism areas 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
222 952 2008 Corporate Tax Reform Act 06A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
223 961 2008 Democratic naturalizations 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
224 962 2008 Distributed information on public votes 01B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
225 963 2008 Quality and efficiency of health insurance 10A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
226 973 2008 Stricter laws on sexual offenses 01A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
227 971 2008 Flexible age insurance 10D Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
228 972 2008 Associations' right of appeal 09B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
229 974 2008 Cannabis policy and youth protection 10A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
230 975 2008 Narcotics and psychotropic substances 10A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
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231 981 2009 Free movement of persons 02A Yes Pro status quo Left-wing Ideological 
232 991 2009 Support complimentary medicine 10B Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
233 992 2009 Exchange of passport information 02A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
234 1001 2009 Disability insurance 06A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
235 1002 2009 General popular initiatives 01B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
236 1011 2009 Financing aviation tasks 08A Yes Pro change Right-wing Environmentalist 
237 1012 2009 Prohibition of military exports 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
238 1013 2009 Against the construction of minarets 10G* Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
239 1021 2010 Regulations on human research 11B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
240 1022 2010 Legal protection of animals 09A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
241 1023 2010 Age insurance 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
242 1031 2010 Unemployment insurance  10E Yes Pro change Right-wing Generational 
243 1042 2010 Expulsion of criminal foreigners 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
244 1042 2010 Expulsion of criminal foreigners 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
245 1043 2010 Support tax fairness 06A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
246 1051 2011 Protection against armed violence 01A* Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
247 1061 2012 Limiting construction of second homes 09B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
248 1062 2012 Tax-privileged home purchase savings 09B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
249 1063 2012 Support more leave days paid 04A Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
250 1064 2012 Regulation of money games 06A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
251 1065 2012 Book price fixing 12A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
252 1071 2012 Home purchase savings 09B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
253 1072 2012 People's rights in foreign policy 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
254 1073 2012 Health Insurance (Managed Care) 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
255 1083 2012 Support youth music promotion 12A* Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
256 1082 2012 ‘Support old age living/residency’ 10C Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
257 1081 2012 Protection against passive smoking 09A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
258 1091 2012 Animal Disease Act 05A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
259 1101 2013 Family policy 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
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260 1102 2013 Consumer protection 04B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
261 1103 2013 Spatial Planning Act 09B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
262 1111 2013 People's election of the Federal Council 01B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
263 1112 2013 Urgent changes to the Asylum Act 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
264 1121 2013 Abolition of the military service 03A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
265 1122 2013 Epidemics Act 10A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
266 1123 2013 Labor law  04A Yes Pro change Right-wing Generational 
267 1131 2013 Fair wages 04B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
268 1132 2013 Family policy: Tax reduction 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
269 1133 2013 National Road Expense Article 08B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
270 1141 2014 Support railway infrastructure 08A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
271 1142 2014 Excluding abortion cost from basic insurance 10B Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
272 1143 2014 Against mass immigration 10G Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
273 1151 2014 Issues in basic Health Insurance 10B Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
274 1152 2014 Against pedophiles working with children 01A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
275 1153 2014 Rise in minimum wage 04A Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
276 1154 2014 Fund for the procurement of jet fighters 03A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
277 1161 2014 Taxes in hospitality industry 06B Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
278 1162 2014 Public health insurance 10B Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
279 1171 2014 Abolition of flat-rate taxation 06A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
280 1172 2014 Against overpopulation  10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
281 1173 2014 National Bank's gold storage in Switzerland 06B* Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
282 1181 2015 Tax free child benefit and training bonus 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
283 1182 2015 Higher energy taxes instead of VAT increases 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
284 1191 2015 Reproductive and genetic engineering 11B Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
285 1192 2015 Support scholarships 11A Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
286 1193 2015 Increasing inheritance tax for age insurance 10C Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
287 1194 2015 Changes to the Radio and Television Article 06A* Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
288 1201 2016 Family and marriage policy 10F Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
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289 1202 2016 Expulsion of criminal foreigners 10G Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
290 1203 2016 Against financial speculation on food prices 04B Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
291 1204 2016 Reconstruction of the Gotthard road tunnel 08A Yes Pro change Right-wing Environmentalist 
292 1211 2016 Public services 06A* Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
293 1212 2016 Unconditional basis income 10E Yes Pro change Left-wing Generational 
294 1213 2016 ‘Fair funding of transport’ 08A Yes Pro change Right-wing Environmentalist 
295 1214 2016 Reproductive Medicine Act 10A Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
296 1215 2016 Changes to the Asylum Act 10G Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
297 100001 2016 Support ‘green economy‘  09A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
298 100002 2016 Support age insurance 10C Yes Pro change Left-wing Fiscal 
299 100003 2016 Revision intelligence service 03A Yes Pro change Right-wing Ideological 
300 100004 2016 Exit nuclear energy 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
301 100005 2017 Support immigration 10G* Yes Pro change Left-wing Ideological 
302 100006 2017 Fund for national roads and urban traffic 08A Yes Pro change Right-wing Environmentalist 
303 100007 2017 Corporate Tax Reform Act 06A Yes Pro change Right-wing Fiscal 
304 100008 2017 Federal Energy Act 07A Yes Pro change Left-wing Environmentalist 
Notes: To save space, we only list the mapping of a yes vote to the reform orientation and the political orientation. A no vote mechanically maps to the opposite orientation (e.g. pro 
status quo if yes vote is pro change and right-wing if yes is left wing). Themes are defined in Table 1 in the main paper. After consulting with Swissvotes (the consortium 
providing Swiss referendum data), we assign 12 referenda to themes that do not match the primary official category defined by the Swiss Statistical Office (SFSO) where 
indicated by * (in 12 cases). This was to ensure the best contextual fit and a mutually exclusive definition of themes and attitude groups.  
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